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ABSTRACT
EDUCATION PRODUCTION: TEACHER EVALUATION MODELS
AND WEEKEND FEEDING PROGRAMS
by
Michael D. Kurtz
University of New Hampshire, September, 2015
Education production and, more generally, human capital production, is a signiﬁcant
driver of economic well-being both locally and nationally. This research informs policy deci-
sions regarding how educational inputs are utilized and how those inputs can be inﬂuenced
by the private sector. This dissertation, Education Production: Teacher Evaluation Mod-
els and Weekend Feeding Programs, is comprised of three chapters. The ﬁrst addresses the
rising issue in education policy of the measurement of student-test-based teacher evaluation.
The second examines the scholastic eﬀects of the relatively recent emergence of weekend
feeding programs. The third uses the emergence and spread of the same weekend feeding
programs to understand the factors aﬀecting the adoption of new charitable programs.
Chapter 1 identiﬁes and explains key diﬀerences between the two leading models used
in evaluating teachers based on student standardized test scores. Historically, teacher eval-
uation has been based heavily on subjective measures of assessment. While few policy
makers suggest these subjective measures of teacher quality should be discarded, all states
now at least recommend the use of objective measures of teacher performance based on
student test scores. The two most prominent statistical models of teacher eﬀects, Value
Added Models (VAM) and Student Growth Percentile (SGP) models, while conceptually
xv
similar, diﬀer in estimation method and can lead to sizable diﬀerences in estimated teacher
eﬀects. Using a simulation, I evaluate the relationship under clean and controllable con-
ditions. I then verify that the results persist in observed student-teacher data from North
Carolina. The two models disagree regarding estimated teacher eﬀects when the classroom
distribution of test scores conditional on prior achievement is skewed (i.e. when a teacher
serves a disproportionate number of high- or low- growth students). Moreover, the mag-
nitude of skewness needed to drive these models apart by three or more deciles is within
the ranges observed in the data. As such, a teacher who appears weak in one model may
appear strong when evaluated by the other, yet typically only a single model is used. To
further the eﬀective use of these objective evaluation methods in high-stakes decisions such
as payment, retention, and tenure, a complete understanding of their diﬀerences is vital.
Chapter 2 examines how weekend feeding programs aﬀect both educational and behav-
ioral outcomes. Weekend feeding programs provide weekend food to students who otherwise
may have limited access to nutritious food between their free school lunch on Friday and
free breakfast at school on Monday. In particular, I focus on the BackPack program (a
national program through the Feeding America food bank) in Northwestern North Car-
olina. This is the ﬁrst economic study to examine the eﬀects of weekend feeding programs
on standardized test scores, attendance, or behavioral incidents. I compile a unique data
set of program enrollment at each participating school over time, which I then match to
restricted student outcome and demographic data. Although the data do not identify
which students actually receive the food, the intent-to-treat eﬀect of these programs can
be estimated by comparing the outcomes for students who are and are not eligible for the
program via a quasi-experimental, panel diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology. The poten-
tially treated group is the free/reduced lunch eligible student population at schools with an
active BackPack program. Ineligible students at BackPack schools and eligible students at
xvi
non-participating schools act as control groups. Simple descriptive diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
models suggest these programs beneﬁt students. However, more complete models reverse
this ﬁnding, and I explore several alternative explanations. A false-start-date analysis (ex-
amining the eﬀects of a two-year lead of program adoption) suggests that negative selection
could be driving the negative association between student outcomes and program partici-
pation. Conditions two years prior to program adoption are associated with both poorer
student outcomes as well as the decision to adopt a BackPack program. This work serves
to provide a comprehensive ﬁrst look at these programs and to highlight the importance of
addressing non-random selection in identifying a causal link between program participation
and student outcomes.
Chapter 3 uses the same BackPack programs from Chapter 2 in Northwestern North
Carolina to understand key factors associated with the decision and timing of program
adoption. Many studies have examined the causes and determinants of charitable giving,
but not often are we able to observe the emergence, expansion, and adoption of a new and
wide-spread private charity. The BackPack programs provide a unique microcosm of the
donor-recipient relationship because they are largely locally funded and staﬀed and require
substantial community buy-in. I use the same unique data set of program enrollment
collected for Chapter 2, along with school data from the North Carolina Department of
Public Instruction to understand recipient characteristics, as well as census tract data
from the US Census and American Community Survey to understand donor (community)
characteristics and how they changed over time. I ﬁnd mild support for the common ﬁnding
that donor racial diversity is negatively associated with charitable giving; however, I also
show that donor income diversity is positively associated with program adoption (requiring
donations of both time and money). I further ﬁnd strong evidence that schools are more
likely to adopt a program the more prevalent BackPack programs are in their county, as
xvii
well as evidence that deteriorating local economic conditions (measured by the change in
the local unemployment rate) play a signiﬁcant role in adoption.
Taken together, Chapters 1-3 provide an examination of educational inputs: the mea-
surement of teacher performance, the eﬀects of weekend nutrition on scholastic outcomes,
and the adoption process for student-centric community intervention. The following pages
provide the details of these analyses.
xviii
Chapter 1
Classroom Evaluation Models Using
Student Test Scores: A Comparison
of Value Added and Student Growth
Percentile Models
This chapter identiﬁes how two leading models of teacher eﬀectiveness, Value Added Models
(VAM) and Student Growth Percentile (SGP) models compare to each other. Variations of
both models are currently in use across the United States and a limited body of work has
provided direct comparisons of their reliability and validity. I expand this work by identify-
ing, both theoretically and empirically, the characteristics of the data that cause these two
models to agree or disagree and show that variation in observable classroom characteristics
can cause estimated classroom eﬀects to diﬀer by as many as 4 deciles between models. As
such, a particular teacher can appear in the bottom third according to one model while
appearing in the top third in the other.
1
While there are valid arguments both for and against the use of student test scores to
evaluate teachers, the reality is that they are being used. The most notable implementations
are the Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVAAS) in Tennessee and an SGP
model in Colorado (sometimes called the Colorado Model). VAMs are in use in 12 other
states and Washington D.C. and SGP models are in use in 17 other states. Federal grant
programs such as the Teacher Incentive Fund and Race to the Top strongly encourage the
linkage of teacher performance to personnel decisions. If some form of teacher evaluation
based on student test scores is to be used, a state selects a particular model with which to do
so. My research shows that model selection has clearly identiﬁable implications regarding
the types of classrooms that are viewed more or less favorably compared to an alternative
model. This work plays an important role in understanding the models that are in use and
upon which more weight is increasingly being placed.
I ﬁrst make use of simulated data to illustrate the diﬀerences in the simplest form, free
from real-world confounding factors. I show the main factor driving the disagreement about
a particular classroom between VAM and SGP models is skewness in current year test scores
conditional on prior year test scores. I then show that the issues not only persist in the
real-world data but the skewness exists with suﬃcient magnitude to drive large diﬀerences
between the estimates of teacher eﬀects.
1.1 Institutional Usage
In 2012 the Center on Great Teachers & Leaders at American Institutes for Research pub-
lished a survey of all 50 states and Washington D.C. regarding education policies and
practices.1 Part of the survey explored how states employ student test scores and related
1This was a review of publicly available documents such as state legislation, administrative and civil
codes, legislative hearings and testimony, and any information or training material provided on states'
department of education websites (The Center on Great Teachers and Leaders, web database tool, 2014).
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models to assess teacher performance. Questions were asked regarding whether a state
mandated (or recommended) that student growth measures be included in teacher evalua-
tion, what type of model was either mandated or recommended, how much weight ought
to be attached to such measures, and how a state mandated, recommended, or allowed the
measures to be used in human resource decisions such as pay, advancement, and retention
decisions. Below, I summarize the responses to the following questions regarding teacher
evaluation:
1. Does the state mandate (or recommend) that student growth measures2 be included?
(a) If yes, what model of measurement does the state require? (Value Added Model,
Percentile Model, Gain Scores, Covariate Adjusted, Layered)
2. If multiple measures, how much weight is given to student growth measures?
3. If applicable, what is the anticipated date for rolling out the system?
4. Does the state mandate, recommend, or allow evaluation results to be used in hu-
man resource decisions? (teacher distribution, promotion, dismissal, renewal, tenure,
compensation, etc.)
Overall, 40 states and Washington D.C. mandate student growth measures be included
in some capacity in teacher evaluation. The remaining 10 states recommend their usage
(Figure 1.1). As of the completion of the survey, 13 states and Washington D.C. either
mandate or recommend the use of Value Added Models3 while 18 states mandate or rec-
ommend the use of Student Growth Percentile4 models (Figure 1.1). The remaining states
2Student growth measures is a general term for models or statistics that use student test scores to assess
teachers and does not relate only to Student Growth Percentile models despite the similar terminology.
3States that mandate or recommend VAM: Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington D.C., and Wisconsin.
4States that mandate or recommend SGP models: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
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either make no recommendation or specify some alternative model. No states mandate or
recommend more than one model.
The weights speciﬁed or allowed when using student growth measures in conjunction
with other means of assessing teacher performance vary considerably and often take the
form of allowable ranges. No weight or allowable range of weights were speciﬁed by 21
states. Of the remaining states, some speciﬁed speciﬁc values (e.g. Michigan speciﬁes that
student growth measures comprise 25% of a teacher's evaluation). Other states specify a
range of allowable weights (e.g. Tennessee allows weights to range between 25% and 35%).
Some states provide a minimum requirement, others require all components of an evaluation
must be weighted equally. The smallest weight of those speciﬁed is 5% in Hawaii where
weights are allowed to range from 5-25%. On the high end, a number of states specify
the weight must be 50% or at least 50%.5 In an attempt to provide a reasonable average
of allowable weights I ﬁnd the average is 34.4%.6 According to the survey, 39 states had
already begun or planned to begin using student growth measures by 2014 with six states
planning to begin in 2015 and six states either unknown or unreported.
Only two states report that they do not mandate, recommend or allow student growth
measure evaluation results to be used in human resource decisions (Connecticut and Ne-
braska). Of the 31 states to specify which human resource decisions are at least allowed to
be based on student growth measures, 27 specify dismissal, termination, or renewal; 16
specify pay or compensation; and 14 specify tenure. Student growth measures are not
only widely used (all 50 states and D.C. either mandate or recommend usage), but they are
relied upon heavily (on average comprising more than a third of the teacher's evaluation)
to make high-stakes decisions regarding teacher retention, pay, and tenure. The frequency
Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia.
5Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, and South Dakota.
6Done by averaging the ranges speciﬁed by each state and then taking the mean of these values condi-
tional on having any values speciﬁed. If a speciﬁc percentage is speciﬁed, then this value is used.
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and consequence with which student growth measures are used underscores the need for
a complete understanding of how they function and the scenarios in which they provide
contrasting inference regarding teacher eﬀectiveness.
1.2 Literature
Staiger and Rockoﬀ (2010) note ﬁve key points that summarize much of the existing lit-
erature surrounding teacher performance and evaluation. First, there are large diﬀerences
between the eﬀects diﬀerent teachers have on students. Second, the estimated teacher ef-
fects are noisy with low correlations across years. Third, teacher eﬀectiveness rises quickly
in the ﬁrst few years of employment but plateaus quickly. Fourth, while there are costs as-
sociated with hiring or ﬁring, the primary cost associated with teacher turnover is that the
students will likely be taught by a novice. Fifth, at the time of hire, it is diﬃcult to identify
those teachers who will perform better than others. With these well-established points in
mind, it makes sense to work toward improving overall teacher eﬀectiveness. Instead of fo-
cusing on pre-hire characteristics, recruitment and retention policies could utilize measures
of teacher on-the-job performance. This recommendation is backed up by the common
ﬁnding that teacher credentials and academic background are poor predictors of eﬀective
teaching (Kane et al., 2008; Ballou, 1996). While there are good reasons to implement such
strategies, problems still exist with the models that are currently in use (discussed later).
This paper helps to improve our understanding of how VAM and SGP models diﬀer such
that they can be utilized more eﬀectively.
Examining a possible course of action, Goldhaber and Hansen (2010), using North
Carolina data, ﬁnd that if the bottom 25% of teachers were deselected and replaced by
the average of ﬁrst- and second- year teachers, student test scores would be 2.5% higher.
However, labor market dynamics, such as a changing pool of new applicants, which could
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appreciably aﬀect the estimated eﬀects are not accounted for (Goldhaber and Hansen,
2010). This ﬁnding is partially supported by Wang and Weiss (1998) who characterize a
theoretical model for thinking about time to tenure and the tenure decision for teachers. It
provides rationale for diﬃcult tenure attainment coupled with large wage hikes as well as
rationale for extending probation but not ﬁring those who do not attain tenure initially.
Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) provide a compelling motivation for improving overall
teacher eﬀectiveness in their summary of the many studies to have examined estimated
teacher eﬀects. The eﬀect of a one standard deviation increase in estimated teacher eﬀec-
tiveness is often found to be associated with an increase of 0.08 to 0.26 standard deviations
in reading scores and 0.11 to 0.36 in math scores. The eﬀect is of comparable magnitude
to the estimated black-white score gap and the estimated eﬀect of a 10-student decrease
in class size (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010). Further, it has been found that the eﬀect on a
student from having a particular teacher is not limited to a single year and can be tracked
to subsequent years (Sanders and Horn, 1998), such that the positive eﬀects of a teacher
persist but the negative eﬀects persist as well.
Given the large body of evidence that teacher eﬀectiveness is important in academic
outcomes, there have been a number of studies into the eﬀects of merit pay based on stu-
dent test scores. The expected results of such a system are not entirely clear a priori.
Goldhaber et al. (2008) suggest teacher performance pay could be ineﬀective due to three
main concerns. First, teacher output is not readily measurable as it might be for a sales-
person with sales counts or a lawyer with billable hours. Second, there are many factors
aﬀecting students outside of a teacher's control. Third, a teacher has many responsibilities,
only some of which are likely to be tied to their compensation. It is not surprising, then,
that the empirical evidence is mixed. Woessmann (2011) ﬁnds that student achievement
is signiﬁcantly higher in countries that make use of teacher performance pay compared to
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countries that do not, after controlling extensively for student, school, and country charac-
teristics. The ﬁnding is far from causal but suggestive of the eﬀectiveness of performance
pay. Similarly, Lavy (2009) reports results from a randomized experiment in Israel ﬁnding
that the test-taking rate, pass rate, and scores were all increased for the students of teachers
oﬀered bonuses based on the measured student outcomes. A survey of the teachers further
found evidence of changes in teaching methods, time spent after school, and responsiveness
to students' needs, while there was no evidence of artiﬁcial inﬂation or manipulation of test
scores. Conversely, Springer et al. (2011), performing a similar experiment in the United
States, found no discernible diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups. Further,
it was found that directly after the experiment began, student outcomes of both treatment
and control groups improved (Springer et al., 2011).
Despite the evidence that teacher eﬀectiveness is an important factor in a student's
educational attainment, there are many issues with measuring teacher eﬀectiveness based
on student test scores. Theoretically, contracts that reward employees (in this case, either
by increasing pay or awarding tenure) based on a single observable characteristic (such as
student test scores) when the employee is responsible for a wider array of tasks can lead
to gaming and increased emphasis on the measured task at the expense of the unmeasured
task (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; Baker et al., 1994). For teaching, un-
measured tasks might include helping students with emotional development, supporting
other teachers, and administrative duties. These are tasks that are vital to a successful
educational institution but may fall by the wayside if test scores are over-emphasized. Fur-
ther, Rothstein (2012) notes that many studies that have focused on performance pay and
selective non-retention of under-performing teachers as a way to improve teaching overall
have ignored key labor market dynamics. Using a simulated model with calibrated param-
eter values, the author suggests that when labor market dynamics (such as the eﬀect on
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the creation of new teachers) are considered, the overall eﬀect of such policies is greatly
diminished.
Even if concerns like labor market dynamics are addressed, there still remains the large
issue of the validity of student growth measures (such as Value Added Models and Student
Growth Percentile models). Beyond the noisiness and low year-to-year correlations, Roth-
stein (2010) ﬁnds non-random student-assignment to classrooms creates large problems for
the validity of these models. Using North Carolina data of grades 3-5 the author shows 5th
grade teacher assignment is a predictor of 4th grade test performance, suggesting a portion
of the eﬀect attributed to the teacher is systematically unrelated to their true underlying
eﬀectiveness.
From an education policy perspective, eﬀective usage of VAM and SGP models encoun-
ters a number of pitfalls. Standardized tests are not able to capture the wide range of
skills we expect teachers to teach (Corcoran, 2010). Hill et al. (2011) explores how VAM
scores correlate to expert ratings of the teacher's ability and ﬁnds that large minority of
teachers were not classiﬁed similarly between the two evaluation methods. Further, VAM
and SGP scores can vary greatly depending on the test instrument used (Corcoran, 2010;
Papay, 2011; Seltzer et al., 1994). Many practitioners also note that there are many factors
outside of the teacher's control. Pauﬂer and Amrein-Beardsley (2014) ﬁnds non-random
(but plausibly beneﬁcial to the students) assignment of students to classrooms can bias the
VAM estimates. Loeb et al. (2014) ﬁnds VAM classiﬁcation is sensitive to ELL students,
showing a VAM based on only ELL students and a VAM based on non-ELL students dis-
agree 55% of the time when comparing on quintile rank. If these issues were addressed,
there would remain the problem that not all subjects are tested such that a VAM or SGP
model could be applied to all teachers, and that teaching is a school-wide eﬀort, suggesting
the classroom teacher is not solely responsible for the growth (or lack of growth) in any
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student (Corcoran, 2010). Lastly, the precision of VAM scores is notably low (Corcoran,
2010), can vary considerably given model speciﬁcation (Goldhaber et al., 2013), as well as
from year to year (Corcoran, 2010).7
Given the possible beneﬁts and potential problems associated with using student growth
measures, it seems clear that more research is needed. Particularly, a more complete under-
standing of the data and methodological requirements for using student achievement data
as a measure of teacher eﬀectiveness is necessary (Staiger and Rockoﬀ, 2010). Reducing
the gap in our understanding is the focus of this paper.
To the best of my knowledge no papers attempt to identify from a theoretical standpoint
what causes the two leading models of student-score-based teacher eﬀectiveness (VAM and
SGP models) to disagree about the estimated eﬀects of a particular teacher. However,
a number of studies have compared these models based on other criteria. Tekwe et al.
(2004) compare diﬀerent school-level VAMs and examine the eﬀect of including demographic
information. Overall, little diﬀerence is found between simple ﬁxed eﬀects models and
mixed eﬀects models, while including student characteristics is shown to have large eﬀects
on estimated school eﬀects (Tekwe et al., 2004).
Using data from the Missouri Assessment Program, Ehlert et al. (2013) ﬁnd strong
agreement between the VAM and SGP models and ﬁnd that a two-step VAM is better able
to account for diﬀerences across schools (compared to the standard VAM and SGP model)
rather than across teachers. Goldschmidt et al. (2012) compare several diﬀerent types
of VAM and SGP models to assess school eﬀects and provide a relatively comprehensive
7It should also be noted that alternative and historically more common subjective measures of teacher
performance are not without their own faults (Goldhaber et al., 2013). Indeed, mistrust and lack of rigor
associated with these subjective measures, in large part, spurred the emergence of student-growth-based
models. Many of the problems encountered with VAM and SGP models exist for subjective measures as
well. Schweig (2014) notes that underlying assumptions of the factor analyses used in school and classroom
environment surveys (used in teacher evaluation) can lead to faulty policy implications if not properly
accounted for.
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discussion of each. Model type is found to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the estimated school
eﬀects and can lead to noticeably diﬀerent inferences about schools (Goldschmidt et al.,
2012). The observation of diﬀerences across model-type provides the basis for my paper,
which seeks to explain the source of these diﬀerences, although my research focuses on
estimated teacher eﬀects rather than school eﬀects. Wright (2010) also attempts to compare
VAM and SGP model estimates of teacher eﬀects and ﬁnds low correlations between VAM
and SGP models in the tails of the teacher distributions (when comparing very good or
very bad teachers). My paper expands upon prior ﬁndings to show the root cause of the
disagreement across models not only in the tails, but for all teachers.
To the best of my knowledge only one study examines what is actually causing model-
disagreements. Goldhaber et al. (2014) examine a number of VAMs and one SGP model.
While they make no claim as to which model is least biased or most valid, they are able to
show that many models disagree about individual teacher eﬀectiveness particularly when
examining teachers in the tails of the eﬀectiveness distributions. Model disagreement is
exacerbated when comparing advantaged or disadvantaged classrooms as measured by the
percent receiving free/reduced lunch (Goldhaber et al., 2014). My paper uses both simu-
lated and actual student/teacher data to take the analysis a step further to identify theoret-
ically as well as empirically what about these classroom characteristics causes the models
to disagree in order to create broader, more generalizable inference.
1.3 Data
Often when examining models of classroom performance criticism arises regarding the non-
random assignment of students to classrooms. Some schools disproportionately serve high
or low performing students and even within schools, some teachers are disproportionately
assigned high or low performing students. For this reason, I employ simulated data that
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has been created in absence of any sort of selection bias. For applicability purposes, I then
apply the same analysis to real-world data from North Carolina schools. The simulated
and North Carolina data are described below.
1.3.1 Simulated Data
To form the simulated data set, 25,000 students are randomly assigned to 1,000 classrooms.
Test scores from year t-1 are assigned randomly to each student from a normal distribution
with a mean of 80 and a standard deviation of 10. This speciﬁcation was chosen for its
ability to produce a similar distribution of estimated eﬀects as seen in the North Carolina
data. However, the overall inference is robust to alterations. Each student is then assigned
a score from year t, which is a function of the prior period score, random idiosyncratic
student variation, and random classroom variation (the same for all students assigned a
classroom).
Scoreit = Scorei,t−1 + StudentV ariationi + ClassroomV aritionj (1.1)
ClassroomV ariation is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 7. The same ClassroomV ariation is assigned to each student, i, in class j.
It is the classroom variation (the variation common to all students in the same class) that
both VAM and SGP models are attempting to identify. It has become common practice
to refer to this as a teacher eﬀect or teacher eﬀectiveness. It is more accurate to think
of it as a classroom eﬀect as it estimates the common eﬀect for all students in the same
classroom. While a teacher is typically common to all students, there are many other
factors not accounted for that are subsumed in the estimate. For this reason, I continue by
referring to these eﬀects as classroom eﬀects unless citing prior work.
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StudentV ariation is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 35. Because students are randomly assigned to classrooms, many classrooms
are comprised of approximately equal positive and negative StudentV ariation. However,
a portion of the classrooms are randomly ﬁlled with StudentV ariation such that the class-
room distribution of StudentV ariation is skewed. It is likely that students in the real
world are assigned non-randomly to classrooms with some classrooms intentionally receiv-
ing a skewed classroom distribution of student variation. If associated with underlying
teacher ability, it may bias the estimation of classroom eﬀects (Rothstein, 2010). This bias
is avoided in the simulated data because student assignment to classrooms is completely
independent from ClassroomV ariation.
An alternative speciﬁcation for StudentV ariation was explored wherein skewness was
explicitly entered into the classrooms rather than allowing it to arise randomly. Half of the
classrooms were drawn from normal distributions but the other half were drawn from beta
distributions with parameters (10,2) and (2,10) (one quarter each) and then all variation was
centered on zero. The overall results were unchanged. The fact that results appear similar
regardless of explicit insertion of skewness is interesting. It means that even in the absence
of non-random selection there is likely still meaningful skewness present in some portion of
the classrooms. It also means that the underlying distribution of StudentV ariation does
not need to be skewed for the inference drawn from this paper to hold true.
1.3.2 Data: North Carolina
The real-world data come from school administrative ﬁles from North Carolina maintained
by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) at Duke University
and range from 2008-2012. These data are particularly useful because they allow for the
linking of student records regarding test scores and demographics, to teachers. Researchers
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can then identify which students were in the same classroom in a particular year and enables
the ability to track particular teachers over time.
These data have been used extensively in prior research on related topics, largely because
of the ability to link teachers and students. Prior to 2006 the only method for linking
students to teachers was to assume that the individual proctoring the end-of-the-year test
for a particular set of students was the classroom teacher. Although, in elementary grades
this approximation may be relatively accurate, it may not always be the case. Starting in
2006 the NCERDC began maintaining Course Membership Files which contain information
about the type of course and the teacher for each student, and provides a much more
accurate method for linking teachers to students. Further, it is possible to identify if a
student attended a specialized course for a particular subject making it much easier to link
a test score in a particular subject to the teacher that actually taught that subject. This
is important because, even in elementary school, a student may not always have a single
all-subject teacher.
For purposes of comparability with prior literature and simplicity I restrict my sample
to 4th grade math teachers linked to 4th grade End-of-Grade math exams. Although the
Course Membership ﬁles began in 2006, I restrict my analysis to 2008-2012 as signiﬁcant
recoding occurred between 2006 and 2007.
Math teachers are identiﬁed using the state course code associated with their course in
the Course Membership ﬁles. A teacher is identiﬁed as a math teacher if they teach a math
course or if they teach math during a block course. A block course is a multi-subject course
such as Social Studies/Math/Science. A teacher is identiﬁed as a general teacher if they
teach an all-day self-contained class. A student's general teacher is designated as a math
teacher in this study only if no speciﬁc math teacher exists. Once teachers are established,
classrooms with fewer than 5 and greater than 30 students are dropped because it is unlikely
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that they represent standard classrooms. Students missing math scores are dropped as
well. Lastly, some of the model variations described below are extremely computationally
intensive so I limit my analysis to a random 10% subsample of total classrooms.8
Table 1.1 reports an average class size of 21.5 in the sample of 4th grade students in
North Carolina classrooms who have a math test score from an exam taken between 2008
and 2012. The average 4th grade test score (score t) is 350.8 while the average 3rd grade
test score (score t-1) is 345.1. This trend alone does not indicate overall improvement as
the tests are scaled diﬀerently between grades as evidenced by the min and max scores
reported.
1.4 Methods
This paper explores the similarities and diﬀerences between the two broad classes of models
termed Value Added Models (VAM) and Student Growth Percentile (SGP) models. Both
VAM and SGP models are capable of a large degree of complexity (Betebenner, 2009;
Wright, 2010; Goldhaber et al., 2014). However, for comparison purposes, the models
compared herein have been simpliﬁed to their most basic levels. For simplicity, regressors
are limited to prior test scores and, for the VAM, teacher ﬁxed eﬀects. One restriction of
this speciﬁcation is that it does not account for non-linearity, which is important in practice
due to the likelihood that classroom eﬀects are not the same for high and low performing
students. A more complex covariate adjusted model is discussed later in the robustness
checks section.
8The analysis has been performed using diﬀerent 10% subsamples with minimal variation in results.
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1.4.1 Value Added Models
The term Value Added Model (VAM) typically refers to a broad class of linear models
that attempt to use current and past student test scores and either ﬁxed or random eﬀects
(sometimes along with other covariates) to identify a speciﬁc classroom's contribution to
the academic performance of students conditional on the students' previous performance
(see Meyer, 1997; Ballou et al., 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010). A simple VAM using




αiAi,t−n + βjI + eitj (1.2)
Here, Aitj denotes the performance of an individual student, i, in year, t, and classroom,
j, and Ai,t−n denotes that same student's performance on the test fromN previous years. In
this case, βj denotes the eﬀect of being in classroom j, and I represents a full set of teacher
indicator variables, while eitj denotes a student-speciﬁc error term. It is the estimate of βj
that is attributed to the teacher using a VAM approach.
VAMs can be expanded to include other covariates such as student, school, or family
characteristics but it is not required. In practice these covariates are not often used, as
implementation can be hard to justify. The inclusion of family income as an explanatory
variable, for example, would imply that diﬀerent performance is expected of poor students
compared to wealthy students. Controlling for individual and family characteristics might
make sense empirically because wealthier families may have more time to spend with a
student on homework (Houtenville and Conway, 2008), may have the money to provide a
tutor, or provide more resources in general. It has been shown, however, that given the
inclusion of only a few years of previous test scores, controlling for demographic variables
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yields very little additional explanatory power (Ballou et al., 2004; McCaﬀrey et al., 2004).
This is likely because models controlling for previous student test scores capture the ma-
jority of the eﬀect of other student characteristics to the extent that they are constant
over time and only aﬀect the level of ability rather than growth rate (Ballou et al., 2004).
However, characteristics that are not constant over time, such as English proﬁciency, may
not be accounted for by prior test scores because most English language learners improve
their proﬁciency substantially over time.
1.4.2 Student Growth Percentile Models
Student Growth Percentile (SGP) models (see Betebenner, 2009) are, on the surface, very
similar to VAMs. A student's growth percentile is calculated by estimating the density of
student test scores in a given year conditioned on prior test scores. This is like a VAM,
which includes prior test scores as right-hand-side variables. The diﬀerence comes in the
estimation and in the calculation of teacher eﬀects. Typically a VAM uses Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression while a SGP is estimated using quantile regression (see Koenker
and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Nonlinearities in SGP models are typ-
ically modeled using cubic b-splines with a varying number of knots (Betebenner, 2009;
Wright, 2010). Quantile regression can be estimated with any number of quantiles speciﬁed
(the extreme being a single quantile regression line, which would estimate the conditional
medians  as opposed to the conditional means of OLS). The term percentiles denotes 99
quantile regression lines and is the standard when implementing SGP models. To calculate
a student's growth percentile their actual score is compared to the ﬁtted values from all
99 quantile regressions; the percentile corresponding to the regression line that best ﬁts
the student's actual score is the student's growth percentile (Wright, 2010). To identify a
speciﬁc classroom eﬀect, students' growth percentiles are aggregated to the classroom- (or
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school- or district-) level using the median for that group (unlike a VAM which uses ﬁxed
eﬀects to identify mean classroom eﬀects).
To understand how SGPs work and why one would expect diﬀerent estimates of teacher
quality than VAM, a basic understanding of quantile regression is necessary. OLS deﬁnes
the sample mean as the solution to the problem of minimizing a sum of squared residuals.
Quantile regression (QR) deﬁnes the sample median as the solution to the problem of
minimizing a sum of absolute residuals. The symmetry of the absolute value function
means the same number of observations must lie above and below the median (the 50th
percentile). It is then possible to reweight the absolute residuals to generate any other
quantile desired (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
Conditional on covariate (or set of covariates), x, the τ th quantile function is given by:
Qy(τ | x) = argmin
∑
ρτ (yi − x′iβ) (1.3)
Here, ρ denotes the absolute value function. From Equations 1.2 and 1.3, it is clear that
the diﬀerence between QR and OLS comes partially in the objective function. That is, QR
minimizes the absolute residuals rather than squared residuals. It is common to estimate the
conditional quantile functions as linear combinations of B-spline cubic functions to smooth
SGP estimates (Wright, 2010; Betebenner, 2009). Splines can be thought of as piecewise
polynomial functions and could also be estimated using least squares methods. However,
here I use a linear speciﬁcation to facilitate direct comparison to the VAM.9 Further, QR can
easily accommodate estimations of coeﬃcients at diﬀerent quantile (not just the median)
by changing τ , such that a single QR analysis could yield many regression lines describing
9Using the cubic spline speciﬁcation is likely to cause VAM and SGP models to appear less similar
because of improved ﬁt in the tails. Incorporating similar non-linearity into a VAM is possible, although
not typically implemented.
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more of the conditional distribution of test scores. In the simplest case, a QR model could
estimate a single regression line through the conditional medians. It is common, however,
to estimate a QR model using deciles such that a separate regression line is estimated at
the conditional 10th percentile, 20th percentile and so on, producing 9 separate regression
lines all with potentially diﬀerent slopes and intercepts. Here, I estimate 99 regression lines
as is consistent with practice for SGP models.
1.4.3 Comparisons
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide a visual explanation of the calculations of- and diﬀerences
between- VAM and SGP models. Figure 1.2 contains 1000 simulated students with test
scores from periods t and t− 1 plotted. Students have been divided into 50 classrooms and
students from a particular classroom, Classroom A, have been bolded as larger, darker
points with grey borders and have been assigned a number.
A standard OLS regression line passes through the (	x, 	y) coordinate for the entire
sample with a slope that minimizes the squared error terms. The VAM adds in a ﬁxed
eﬀect for each classroom. The ﬁxed eﬀect is represented by shifting the regression line
up or down such that the new line maintains the same slope but passes instead through
the (	x, 	y) point for that particular classroom. The VAM estimate of classroom eﬀects is
the amount by which the line is shifted up or down; if the intercept term is suppressed,
the VAM estimate can be equivalently viewed as the classroom-speciﬁc y-intercept. This
is labeled VAM Estimate in Figure 1.2 and is a function of the average period t score
conditional on period t− 1 scores for that particular classroom (Classroom A).
Instead of using OLS, SGP models utilize quantile regression. Although, as is typical
in practice, the analysis uses 99 quantile regressions, Figure 1.2 shows only 9 quantile
regression lines for visual clarity, which represent the 10th-90th quantiles (by 10s). Where
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an OLS regression line represents means conditional on the x-variable(s), each quantile
regression line represents a speciﬁc quantile conditional on the x-variable(s). These are
seen in Figure 1.2, labeled 10-90.
To calculate the SGP estimate of classroom eﬀects, each individual student in the class-
room is assigned the quantile of the regression line that falls closest to their actual point.
For instance, student 22 received a score of approximately 40 in period t−1 and a score of
approximately 60 in period t. This puts student 22 closest to the 20th percentile regression
line, and she is assigned a 20 (or 0.2). The interpretation here is that while student 22
improved her score, she did not improve as much as 80% of the other students who had also
initially scored a 40. Conversely, student 12, who also scored approximately a 40 in period
t− 1 was awarded a score of 110 in period t and as such, falls closest to the 90th percentile
regression line. Student 12 is then assigned a 90 (or 0.9). This same calculation is done
for all students in Classroom A. The distribution of student growth percentile calculations
for Classroom A can be seen in Figure 1.3. To calculate the SGP estimate of classroom
performance, the median of these values is assessed and Classroom A would receive an
estimated classroom performance of 50 (or 0.5).10
For both VAM and SGP models, the estimated eﬀects of Classroom A would then be
viewed in the context of the estimated eﬀects for all other classrooms. When ranked against
the VAM estimated classroom eﬀects of other classrooms, Classroom A appears in the 70th
percentile. That is, the bold VAM line lies above all but 15 of the 50 analogous lines
estimated for other classrooms (not pictured). When ranked against the SGP estimated
classroom eﬀects of other classrooms, Classroom A appears in the 50th percentile.
10It is not the case that the median quantile for a classroom has to be 50. The student quantiles are
calculated based on the entire sample of students. A particular classroom could contain students on either
side of the overall median. This is, in fact, what the SGP model is attempting to measure.
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1.4.4 Discussion of Skewness
VAM and SGP models may appear diﬀerent in terms of how each model goes about cal-
culating estimated classroom eﬀects. VAM relies on OLS and classroom ﬁxed eﬀects to
identify the eﬀect of being in a particular classroom for the average student. SGP models
rely on quantile regression to identify each student's growth percentile based on prior scores.
These percentiles are then summarized at the median for each classroom. Thus there are
really only two fundamental diﬀerences between VAM and SGP models: the distribution
being summarized, and the statistic used to summarize the distribution.
For VAM, the distribution being summarized are the actual current-year test scores
conditional on prior-year test scores. They are conditional on prior-year test scores because
the regression line represents the expected or estimated current-year test score conditional
on prior performance. Thus the classroom average (taken as minimizing the squared devia-
tions from the regression line) is conditional on prior-year scores. The same idea applies to
SGP models. Each quantile regression line is conditional on prior-year scores so deviations
from those lines are also conditional on prior-year scores. With only a few quantiles there is
a large deviation from summarizing actual scores. With a larger number of quantiles (say,
99; as is the case with percentiles) there is less deviation from summarizing actual scores.
While diﬀerences in the summarized distribution are real and non-negligible, the larger
diﬀerence between these two models is in the statistic used to summarize the respective
distributions. VAM uses mean and SGP uses median.
Given that the mean-median diﬀerence seems to be the main diﬀerence, it becomes
clear that skewness in the distributions being summarized (VAM: conditional scores; SGP:
conditional percentiles) causes the two models to disagree.
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1.4.5 Comparison Methods
The estimated classroom eﬀects produced by each model are not on the same scale and so
cannot be directly compared. To keep with methodology used in prior work (Goldschmidt
et al., 2012), I sort the estimated eﬀects into deciles. This allows me to view how each
model ranks a classroom compared to the rest of the sample as well as to compare a speciﬁc
classroom across models. It is the latter comparison with which this study concerns itself.
To make comparisons I use the Decile Diﬀerence deﬁned as:
DecileDifferencej = |V AM Decilej − SGP Decilej | (1.4)
A 0 denotes decile agreement across models for classroom j, a 1 denotes a one decile
diﬀerence, such as VAM placing a classroom in the 6th decile and SGP placing the same
classroom in the 7th, and so forth.
However, Decile Diﬀerence masks some of the important information that exists due
to the discrete nature of splitting the estimates into deciles (or any other groupings). For
instance, a one-decile diﬀerence could mean that the two models produced estimates that
were very close but on either side of a decile-cut-point (virtually indistinguishable from each
other) or it could mean that the two estimates were almost 20 percentage points apart. A
wide range in variability is masked when the Decile Diﬀerence measure is used. Thus,
I also focus my analysis on a continuous measure of model agreement by examining the
correlations between the estimated teacher eﬀects between models. This methodology has
also been utilized in prior work (Tekwe et al., 2004; Goldhaber et al., 2014; Goldschmidt et
al., 2012; Ehlert et al., 2013). It should then be the case that correlations are higher and
the Decile Diﬀerence is lower when the skewness of classroom test scores (conditional on
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prior test scores) is low.
1.5 Findings
VAM uses mean and SGP uses median to draw inference about a classroom. Due to the
existence of skewness in the summarized distributions, the two models disagree sometimes.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.2 show, in the North Carolina data, the two models agree
perfectly (decile diﬀerence =0) less than half the time and are within one decile of each
other just less than 90% of the time. The simulated data described above has comparable
characteristics (Table 1.2, Columns 3 and 4).
1.5.1 Findings: Simulated Data
I begin by examining simulated data because often real-world occurrences such as non-
random classroom assignment can confound the estimation of classroom eﬀects. In the
following section, I show that the ﬁndings in the simulated data persist in the North Carolina
data.
As seen in Table 1.2, standard VAM and SGP models can disagree fairly often by 3
and 4 deciles. A large portion of the disagreement can be accounted for by forcing the
two models to use the same summary statistic. I compare a standard VAM to an SGP
model that summarizes the student percentiles at the classroom mean (instead of the usual
median), and I compare a standard SGP model to a VAM that summarizes the classroom
scores at the median rather than mean. I do this by estimating a quantile regression model
at the 50th percentile of current scores on past scores and classroom ﬁxed eﬀects.11
Table 1.3 shows the modiﬁed VAM and SGP models that both use means (medians)
11This is for illustrative purposes only. Canay (2011) notes that standard ﬁxed eﬀects models rely on
diﬀerencing (demeaning) techniques that require that expectations are linear operators. In the case of
conditional quantiles (used in quantile regression), this requirement is violated.
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agree exactly in terms of decile placement in 71.9% (77%) of cases. The modiﬁed models
agree within 1 decile more than 99% (97%) of the time compared to less than 80% of the
time with the standard models. A large amount of the disagreement between VAM and
SGP models comes simply from using diﬀerent measures of central tendency to summarize
classroom performance.
Table 1.3 also provides model correlations that show the decile diﬀerences are not driven
by arbitrary cut points. The correlations show the standard models do agree quite well
(perhaps better than would be expected given the models agree perfectly less than 50%
of the time in terms of deciles), with a correlation of 0.92. However, when comparing the
models that use the same summary statistic, the correlations rise to approximately 0.99.
Table 1.3 shows a large portion of the disagreement between VAM and SGP models
comes from the use of diﬀerent summary statistics. However, means and medians are
equal in the absence of skewness in the summarized distribution. Thus, given VAMs use
means and SGP models use medians, it is skewness in the classroom distribution of scores
(conditional on prior test scores) that is driving much of the disagreement between these
two models.
Table 1.3 shows the correlation between the standard models by (absolute) conditional
skewness tercile. Tercile 1 contains classrooms that exhibit very little skewness and the
correlation is relatively high at 0.951. Tercile 3 contains classrooms that exhibit very high
skewness and the correlation is relatively low at 0.865. A Chi Squared test for the joint
equality of the correlations across skewness terciles rejects the null hypothesis that all they
are equal to each other. This provides further evidence that skewness is the driver of
disagreement between VAM and SGP models.
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1.5.2 Findings: North Carolina Data
The analysis began by using simulated data to create the cleanest possible picture of the
diﬀerences between the VAM and SGP models. It is important, however, that the insights
obtained in the simulated data persist in the real-world for those insights to be relevant for
policy discussions. I now present ﬁndings from the North Carolina school data.
Table 1.4 again shows VAM and SGP models that use the same summary statistic agree
far more often than the standard models with 98.1% and 95.8% agreement within 1 decile
for models which both use means or both use medians respectively (compared to 84.9%
with the standard models). Table 1.4 also shows the same relationship using correlations.
The standard VAM/SGP correlation is 0.939. This is comparable to the spearman rank
correlation found in Goldhaber et al. (2014) of 0.94. The correlations then grow to 0.984
and 0.974 for comparisons where both models use means and medians, respectively.
Again, given that VAMs use means and SGP models use medians, it is skewness that
is driving estimates of classroom eﬀectiveness apart. This can be seen in the correlations
described in Table 1.4. Here it is clear that the correlation between VAM and SGP models
for low-skewness classrooms (classrooms in the bottom third of classroom skewness) is
greater than the correlation for high-skewness classrooms (classrooms in the top third of
classroom skewness), 0.959 compared to 0.92. A Chi Squared test for the joint equality of
the three correlation coeﬃcients rejects the null hypothesis that all three are equal to each
other.
Table 1.3 (for simulated data) and 1.4 (for North Carolina Data) provide strong evidence
showing that classroom skewness is a driving force behind model disagreement. They do
not, however, show how much skewness of magnitudes found in the real world can cause the
two models to disagree. As stated before, the two factors that drive VAM and SGP models
apart are skewness in the summarized distribution and the distribution being summarized.
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The distribution being summarized varies between VAM and SGP models because of the
diﬀerences in estimation and classroom summary described in the Section 4. In order
to isolate the diﬀerences caused by skewness alone, I hold the summarized distribution
constant. That is, standard VAM (which uses classroom means) is compared to VAM
using classroom medians and the standard SGP model (which uses classroom medians)
is compared to an SGP model using classroom means. The summarized distribution is
held constant such that all disagreements are caused by skewness alone. Table 1.5 shows
skewness alone is capable of causing VAM and SGP estimates to diverge by as many as 4
deciles by providing comparisons of models using the same estimation method but diﬀerent
measures of central tendency. This is diﬀerent than the analysis described in Tables 1.3
and 1.4, which compares models using diﬀerent estimation method (OLS with ﬁxed eﬀects
and quantile regression) but the same measure of central tendency.
With a 4 decile disagreement, a classroom appearing in the top third of classrooms
according to one model could appear in the bottom third of classrooms according to the
other. Similarly, a 3 decile disagreement could cause a classroom to appear in the top
quarter of the eﬀectiveness distribution according to one model and the bottom half of the
distribution according to the other. While there are relatively few classrooms that fall into
these categories, it is important to keep in mind that the are ﬁndings from a 10% subsample
of classrooms and describe actual teachers about whom meaningful personnel decisions are
being made.
1.5.3 Covariate Adjusted VAM
Both the VAM and SGP model used in this study have been simpliﬁed down to their
most basic levels to explore the fundamental diﬀerences between the two methodologies.
However, if the ﬁndings of the simpliﬁed models do not persist when using more realistic
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models, the policy signiﬁcance is diminished.
There is no single VAM or SGP model used in practice (a second reason for compar-
ing the simplest forms). However, many VAMs used in practice are covariate adjusted
models. This means they control for student characteristics beyond prior year test scores.
Florida uses one such VAM and controls for student characteristics: disability status, En-
glish language learner status, gifted status, attendance, mobility within school-years, and
age diﬀerence from the modal grade age in months (Florida, 2011).12
I do not have access to all of these characteristics, but adjust the VAM speciﬁcation to
control for limited English proﬁciency, disability status, and migrant status (the SGP model
remains unchanged). The results are presented in Table 1.6 - 1.9. Any classroom that did
not have at least 10 students left after removing students with missing values were removed
from the analysis. For consistency, I present the simple VAM and SGP comparisons re-
estimated with the smaller sample (Table 1.6) along side the covariate adjusted VAM and
SGP comparisons (Table 1.7). Table 1.7 shows that the ﬁndings from the simple models
persist when controlling for student characteristics. The covariate adjusted VAM and simple
SGP models agree perfectly 39.3% of the time (39.5% of the time with unadjusted VAM).
This jumps to 56.17% and 48.6% when comparing models that both use means or both use
medians, respectively (Table 1.7). The same pattern exists when examining the correlations,
which rise from 0.93 in with the standard models to 0.97 and 0.96 for the models that use
the same summary statistics. This shows even when controlling for student characteristics
in the VAM, conditional skewness in test scores drives large diﬀerences between VAM and
SGP models.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show that when controlling for student characteristics, the amount of
disagreement driven by skewness remains large (again, Table 1.8 represents the unadjusted
12North Carolina uses the SASR© EVAAS model, a proprietary VAM that does not control for student
characteristics.
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VAM and SGP models estimated with the sample available to the models incorporating
student characteristics in Table 1.9). Table 1.9 shows when adjusting for student char-
acteristics in the VAM, the diﬀerences driven by skewness can be as large at 3 deciles,
with 1.7% of the classrooms falling in this range. This is comparable to the diﬀerences in
the unadjusted VAMs with 2.16% of the classrooms diﬀering by at least 3 deciles due to
skewness.
There are other student characteristics that could be used, and other complexities that
may be incorporated. However, this exercise suggests that greater model complexity does
not alter the fact that VAM and SGP models disagree in large part- and with meaningful
magnitude due to skewness in the distribution of test scores (conditional on prior year test
scores).
1.6 Conclusion and Future Work
While a number of studies have documented that diﬀerences exist between diﬀerent VAM
and SGP models, this is the ﬁrst study to identify the underlying factor that drives model
diﬀerences. While VAM and SGP models appear diﬀerent in their methodology, ultimately
they provide very similar estimates of classroom eﬀectiveness for the majority of classrooms.
However, I ﬁnd evidence for the a priori hypothesis that the main characteristic of the
data that causes the two models to diverge is classroom skewness in current-year test scores
(conditional on prior-year test scores). I further show that skewness of magnitudes observed
in the actual student-teacher data can drive large diﬀerences between the models on the
order of 3 and 4 deciles, a meaningful ﬁnding when one considers these models are being
used to inform compensation, retention, and tenure decisions.
While disagreements of such magnitudes may seem troubling, it is worth pointing out
that skewness is observable. It is possible to adjust one's interpretation of the eﬀectiveness
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estimate linked to a particular teacher if it is known that their classroom was particularly
skewed that year. If the classroom exhibits positive conditional skewness, the VAM estimate
(all else equal) provides an inﬂated estimate compared to the SGP model (as seen in Figure
1.3). Likewise if the classroom is negatively skewed, the VAM estimate (all else equal)
provides a diminished estimate compared to the SGP model. This paper does not claim to
identify which model is better, but rather identiﬁes where and by how much the two models
disagree and suggests that this be carefully considered when selecting a model to use.
In the future, it is important to identify which observable classroom and student char-
acteristics are associated with conditional classroom skewness and whether positive and
negative skewness aﬀect the models in the same way. Positive and negative skewness have
been treated as if they are indistinguishable but it might be the case that a teacher dras-
tically changes his/her pedagogy in the presence of a large proportion of potentially low





Table 1.1: North Carolina Class and Test Score Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Class Size 36459 21.5 4.7 10 30
Score t 36459 350.8 9.6 319 373
Score t-1 36459 345.1 9.1 315 370
Table 1.2: VAM-SGP Decile Diﬀerence: North Carolina and Simulated Data
North Carolina Simulated
Dec. Diﬀ. Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 746 41.7 393 39.3
1 775 43.3 381 38.1
2 217 12.1 159 15.9
3 43 2.4 51 5.1
4 9 0.5 15 1.5
5 1 0.1 1 0.1
Total 1,791 100 1000 100
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Table 1.3: Model Agreement Comparisons of VAM and SGP Models; Simulated Data
Standard VAM/SGP VAM / Mean SGP SGP / Med. VAM
Dec. Diﬀ. Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 393 39.3 719 71.9 770 77
1 381 38.1 277 27.7 206 20.6
2 159 15.9 4 0.4 22 2.2
3 51 5.1 1 0.1
4 15 1.5 1 0.1
5 1 0.1
Total 1000 100 1000 100 1000 100
Correlation 0.92 0.991 0.988
Standard VAM/SGP Correlations by Absolute Skewness
Tercile Corr. Equality
1 2 3 χ2 Prob > χ2
0.951 0.928 0.865 34.63 0
Table 1.4: Model Agreement Comparisons of VAM and SGP Models; North Carolina
Standard VAM/SGP VAM / Mean SGP SGP / Med. VAM
Dec. Diﬀ. Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 746 41.7 1,151 64.3 1,051 58.7
1 775 43.3 606 33.8 664 37.1
2 217 12.1 34 1.9 71 4
3 43 2.4 4 0.2
4 9 0.5 1 0.1
5 1 0.1
Total 1,791 100 1,791 100 1,791 100
Corr. 0.939 0.984 0.974
Standard VAM/SGP Correlations by Absolute Skewness
Tercile Corr. Equality
1 2 3 χ2 Prob > χ2
0.959 0.94 0.92 19.07 0.0001
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Table 1.5: Degree of Disagreement Due to Skewness: North Carolina
VAM and Med. VAM SGP and Mean SGP
Dec. Diﬀ. Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 877 49 888 49.6
1 736 41.1 773 43.2
2 151 8.4 118 6.6
3 25 1.4 12 0.7
4 2 0.1
Total 1791 100 1791 100
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Table 1.6: Simple VAM and SGP Model Comparisons, Smaller Sample*
Standard VAM/SGP VAM/Mean SGP SGP/Med. VAM
Dec. Diﬀ Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 419 39.49 650 61.26 618 58.25
1 455 42.88 381 35.91 405 38.17
2 148 13.95 28 2.64 34 3.20
3 36 3.39 2 0.19 4 0.38
4 2 0.19
5 1 0.09
Total 1,061 100 1,061 100 1,061 100
Correlation 0.93 0.98 0.97
Standard VAM/SGP Correlations by Absolute Skewness
Tercile Corr. Equality
1 2 3 χ2 Prob > χ2
0.95 0.93 0.91 12.25 0.0022
*Smaller sample is used to provide a direct comparison to the covariate adjusted model
where some observations are dropped due to missing covariate data.
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Table 1.7: Covariate Adjusted VAM and Simple SGP Model Comparisons, Smaller Sample*
Standard VAM/SGP VAM/Mean SGP SGP/Med. VAM
Dec. Diﬀ Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 417 39.30 596 56.17 516 48.63
1 459 43.26 412 38.83 460 43.36
2 139 13.10 50 4.71 78 7.35
3 39 3.68 3 0.28 7 0.66
4 7 0.66
Total 1,061 100 1,061 100 1,061 100
Correlation 0.93 0.97 0.96
Standard VAM/SGP Correlations by Absolute Skewness
Tercile Corr. Equality
1 2 3 χ2 Prob > χ2
0.95 0.93 0.91 9.48 0.0087
*Some observations are dropped due to missing covariate data.
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Table 1.8: Degree of Disagreement Due to Skewness, Smaller Sample*
VAM and Med. VAM SGP and Mean SGP
Dec. Diﬀ Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 496 46.75 513 48.35
1 459 43.26 462 43.54
2 83 7.82 77 7.26
3 22 2.07 9 0.85
4 1 0.09
Total 1061 100 1061 100
*Smaller sample is used to provide a direct comparison to
the covariate adjusted model where some observations are
dropped due to missing covariate data.
Table 1.9: Covariate Adjusted* VAM and Simple SGP Degree of Disagreement Due to Skewness
VAM and Med. VAM SGP and Mean SGP
Dec. Diﬀ Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
0 494 46.56 513 48.35
1 457 43.07 462 43.54
2 92 8.67 77 7.26
3 18 1.7 9 0.85
Total 1061 100 1061 100
*Some observations are dropped due to missing covariate data.
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Figure 1.1: Mandate States with Model Type
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Figure 1.2: VAM and SGP Model Comparison
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Scholastic Eﬀects of Weekend
Feeding Programs
Despite ranking amongst the richest nations in the world, food insecurity is an issue that
persists for a non-trivial portion of the population of the United States. In 2012, 10% of
households with children reported very low food security (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2013).
Food insecurity has been linked to diminished health and educational outcomes (Alaimo
et al., 2001; Winicki and Jemison, 2003; Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Alderman et al., 2006;
Maluccio et al., 2006; Victora et al., 2008). Some of this food insecurity in children is
mitigated by free breakfast and lunch programs at schools. However, the potential for
food insecurity still exists in the evening and over the weekend. This gap in adequate
childhood food security has given rise to what many call weekend feeding programs.
While implementation may vary from one organization to the next, the general concept is
the same: provide children with food each week to sustain them through the weekend.
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Weekend feeding programs are expanding across the county but it is not yet known how
they aﬀect students. This study merges unique primary program participation data with
restricted administrative student data to provide the ﬁrst economic examination of how
these programs are related to academic performance and behavioral outcomes. Speciﬁcally,
I focus on how these programs aﬀect student performance on state-wide standardized exams
in math and reading, as well as attendance and behavioral incidents. Simple diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence models suggest beneﬁcial eﬀects for math scores, attendance, and behavioral in-
cidents. Less restrictive models reverse this ﬁnding for attendance and behavioral incidents
and ﬁnd no eﬀect on test scores. Additional speciﬁcations suggest the diﬀerence between
these models may be driven by program selection (unobserved time-varying characteristics
that aﬀect student outcomes and the decision to adopt).
Because weekend feeding programs are privately-provided and adoption is non-compulsory,
program participation is at least partially endogenously determined in any student-outcome
equation. As with many social programs, individual selection (student selection, in this
case) is an issue because those who choose to enroll in the program are likely fundamen-
tally diﬀerent than those who do not. Weekend feeding programs bring an additional layer
of selection in the form of community selection because a community can choose to adopt
a program or not. Further, it is not a priori clear in which direction the selection is likely
to manifest itself. This paper pays particular attention to the issue of selection and shows
that not accounting for selection can signiﬁcantly bias the estimated program eﬀect.
Section 2.2 discusses the past research on the relationship between nutrition and student
outcomes. Section 2.2 outlines the speciﬁc programs and data upon which this study is
based. Section 2.3 explains the selection issues and the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 2.4
provides the analysis and discussion and Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.1 Past Research
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst economic study to examine how weekend feeding programs
aﬀect student outcomes, but past research on food insecurity has provided two important
pillars for my current work. First, food insecurity, even to a small degree, is linked to
diminished educational outcomes. This has been shown to be true in the United States
as well as abroad. Second, selection, even in government provided or mandated programs
such as the National School Lunch Program and the School Breakfast Program, can cause
problems in understanding how these programs aﬀect students because treatment is non-
randomly assigned.
The link between adequate nutrition and educational outcomes for pre-school and
school-aged children is well established (Winicki and Jemison, 2003). In the United States,
food insecurity is linked to poor health independently of low income (Alaimo et al., 2001).
Further, even small levels of food insecurity can negatively aﬀect test scores and learning.
Using a set of questions regarding food insecurity from the Early Childhood Longitudinal
Study, Winicki and Jemison (2003) ﬁnd students who answered in the aﬃrmative to just
one question regarding food insecurity were more similar to the food-insecure students than
the food-secure students. Figlio and Winicki (2005) ﬁnd that schools in danger of sanc-
tions from No Child Left Behind increased the caloric content of their school lunches on
days of testing. This increase in caloric intake by the students is found to be associated
with increases in math, English, and history/social studies test scores. In low- and middle-
income countries it is found that malnutrition negatively aﬀects educational outcomes, hu-
man capital formation, and economic status in adulthood (Alderman et al., 2006; Maluccio
et al., 2006; Victora et al., 2008).
While the evidence that food insecurity and malnutrition leads to diminished learning is
well established, the link between programs designed to mitigate this food insecurity in the
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United States and learning outcomes is not as clear. Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones (2003)
ﬁnd little evidence that the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) improves test scores at
all. In some cases it is found that NSLP participation is actually detrimental to the student's
overall well-being (a composite measure of health, behavioral, and education outcomes).
However, Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones (2004) overturn this negative relationship using
longitudinal data controlling for selection into the program. Once selection is accounted
for, while the negative eﬀects of program participation disappear, there is little evidence
of positive eﬀect except in math scores for male students (Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones,
2004). Using data from the National Health Interview Survey and an instrumental variables
approach based on exogenous changes to state funding formulae, Hinrichs (2010) is able to
ﬁnd large eﬀects on educational attainment but no sizable eﬀect on health in adulthood. The
author notes that the eﬀects are likely attributable to the NSLP inducing better attendance
in school but likely displaced food consumption from other sources, leading to the increased
educational attainment but no real change in health (Hinrichs, 2010).
A similar story emerges when examining the School Breakfast Program in the United
States. Fox et al. (2004) ﬁnd little evidence that school breakfast programs increase educa-
tional outcomes when selection into the program is taken into account. However, Frisvold
(2012), using a regression discontinuity approach based on the discrete threshold requir-
ing schools to provide SBP, ﬁnds program availability increases student achievement. The
author also examines the mechanisms for this process, ﬁnding that availability of school
breakfast does not change the likelihood of a student eating breakfast but does change
what the student eats for breakfast (increasing milk and fruit consumption), and also re-
duces unexcused absences and tardiness (Frisvold, 2012).
To my knowledge only one other study has examined weekend feeding programs. Rodgers
and Milewska (2007) examine the eﬀects of the Arkansas Food for Kids program in a qual-
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itative and quantitative study. The quantitative analysis is based on observations at the
school-level with three years of school outcomes data and no outcome data prior to adop-
tion. Using an OLS model with school and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the authors ﬁnd evidence
that program participation is associated with higher 8th grade math and literacy scores
and fewer expulsions. Both of these ﬁndings are surprising, because the BackPack program
was implemented primarily at the elementary school level. Given the short time frame
of data available for the study, the issue of endogenous program participation is largely
unaddressed.
My research utilizes student-level data incorporating three years of pre-program data
and 5 years after the initial launch from a new state (North Carolina). These data provide
a broader set of outcome and control variables. I employ an econometric methodology that
allows me to control for a wide range of factors that might be correlated with the weekend
feeding program. Additionally, I pay particular attention to individual and community
selection, and the eﬀects they have on estimating program eﬀects. Collectively, these aspects
of my research make it the most complete analysis to date of weekend feedings programs.
2.2 Weekend Feeding Programs: Background and Data
Weekend feeding programs are relatively new and have seen a recent surge in popularity. In
this section I discuss the background of these programs, the speciﬁc program examined in
this study, and the new enrollment data that I have collected showing how the program has
evolved. I then discuss the restricted administrative data from North Carolina containing
student outcomes and student and school characteristics. This section concludes with a
summary description data, which shows how the participating and non-participating schools
diﬀer.
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2.2.1 Weekend Feeding Programs and the Feeding America BackPack
Program
Weekend feeding programs take on several diﬀerent forms, but all operate with the goal of
providing additional food to children over the weekend. The Backpacks for Kids program
began in 1995 in Little Rock, Arkansas. In association with the Arkansas Rice Depot,
the schools began providing backpacks full of ready-to-eat food to students on Fridays so
that students might have more food and better nutrition during the time between school
meals on Friday and Monday. This model has been adopted in many locations since, and in
2006 the BackPack Program was adopted by Feeding America (a nation-wide food bank).
Since then, the Feeding America program has grown to include partnerships with over 150
local food banks and serves 230,000 children per year (FeedingAmerica.org, 2014). This
study focuses on a single Feeding America BackPack program based in Northwestern North
Carolina, which is organized through the Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwest North
Carolina.
The Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwest North Carolina (SHFB) served 72 schools
(and 7 non-school locations, not included in this study) with their BackPack program in
northwestern North Carolina in 2013 (the 2012-2013 school year), and serves 82 schools
currently. Schools are identiﬁed to participate in the program when a person or group
reaches out to the SHFB to start a program. To be eligible, Feeding America requires the
school have at least 50% of the student body enrolled in the Free/Reduced Lunch program
and at least 50 students identiﬁed to start the BackPack program. The food for each stu-
dent comes from a Feeding America center in Nashville, Tennessee and is transported to
SHFB as well as other food banks running a BackPack program in other regions. Each
pack contains two servings of grains (usually cereal), three servings of fruit (usually, 100%
juice boxes and fruit cups), two servings of protein, two servings of milk, and one serving
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of vegetables. A local community partner organization is then responsible for obtaining,
storing, packing, and delivering the food each week. This partner can be an established
community organization such as a church, or Boys and Girls Club, or it could be an organi-
zation formed speciﬁcally for the purpose of participating in the BackPack program. There
is relatively little work required of the school administration and employees.
The BackPack program expanded consistently from year to year starting as 4.2% of
all potentially eligible schools (9 BackPack schools) in 20091 to 72 schools served in 2013
representing 25.8% of all potentially eligible schools (Table 2.1).2 Potentially eligible is
comprised of all schools with greater than 50% of the study body eligible for free/reduced
lunch.3 Schools that are eligible for a program but do not adopt (or have not yet adopted)
are denoted "non-participating". Figure 2.1 shows the counties in North Carolina that are
served by the BackPack program run by SHFB between 2009 and 2013. Figure 2.2 shows
the expansion of this BackPack program is geographically correlated and concentrated in
four main counties (Davidson, Forsyth, Guilford, and Yadkin). Table 2.1 shows the number
of BackPack schools and non-participating schools by county from 2009, the ﬁrst year of the
BackPack program, through 2013. These counties comprise 53 of the 72 BackPack schools in
2013 (Table 2.1). Davidson, Forsyth and Guilford Counties share borders with each other;
Yadkin County borders Forsyth County. Due to the recession, the non-participating schools
were changing substantially over this time-frame.4 In order to have a stable comparison
group, I balance the panel of schools on those who were eligible for a program in 2009
1For simplicity the 2008-2009 school year is referred to as 2009; similar nomenclature is followed for
subsequent years.
2The BackPack program of SHFB oﬃcially began in 2006 with two schools. The program was restruc-
tured at the start of 2009 to take the form in which it now exists. These two schools have been dropped
from the analysis.
3A school is actually eligible if they have 50% participating in the free/reduced lunch program and
if there are 50 students ready to begin the BackPack program. Free/reduced lunch participation is not
measured in the North Carolina data and there is no measure of interested students in non-participating
schools.
4Free/reduced lunch eligibility is largely based on income.
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regardless of their prior or future eligibility. This balanced panel is described in the last
line of Table 2.1.
Although it is not known which students participate in the program, the total number of
participants at each school in each year is known. I use this information to create a program
intensity measure deﬁned as [Intensity = #Enrolled/#Eligible for Free or Reduced Lunch].
Table 2.2 shows how program intensity changes with the age of a program. Panel 1 of Table
2.2 summarizes all schools together and shows a large discrete jump in program intensity
from zero prior to program adoption to an average of 0.3 (30% take-up) in the ﬁrst year.
After that, program intensity grows by 5-8pp per year. Panels 2 and 3 of Table 2.2 split the
schools into early- and late-adopters (early denotes adoption in 2009 or 2010; late denotes
adoption in 2011 or later). Communities to adopt early show greater take-up, holding
program age constant.
Students are most often selected to participate in the program when a teacher or nurse
recommends the student be enrolled in the program. At that time, a letter goes home to
the parent or guardian for consent and allergy information. It is also possible for a parent
or guardian to approach the BackPack program directly, but this is less common.
There are two additional weekend feeding programs that operate in the same area 
The Independent Weekend Feeding Program and the School Pantry Program  serving
approximately 2,100 and 1,100 students per month as of February, 2014 respectively (See
Figure 2.1). These programs are similar to the BackPack Program, but do not have the strict
enrollment criteria that 50% of the students to be on the Free/Reduced Lunch program and
that at least 50 students express an interest in the program. Further, both programs provide
their own food rather than obtaining it from the Feeding America center in Nashville. The
programs use this ﬂexibility to provide more food and attempt to target the entire family
rather than a single student. The earliest of these programs began in 2011, more recently
46
than the BackPack programs. While historical data needed to analyze the other programs
are not available, the programs are incorporated into the analysis by controlling for schools
in which an alternative program is present in January 2014.5
2.2.2 North Carolina Student Data
The North Carolina school data come from administrative ﬁles maintained by the North
Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) at Duke University. These data
have been used extensively in education research (Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010; Bifulco
and Ladd, 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber, 2007; Miranda et al., 2007). Data
regarding tests administered at the end of each grade range back to 1993 and contain both
math and English test scores which are linked to a student with a randomized student
identiﬁer and the school that administered the exam. Starting in 2006, these data also
contain information regarding the number of absences and behavioral issues, such as bus
misbehavior, disruptive classroom behavior, and aggressive behavior, by students. These
behavioral issues data are particularly useful because they track the date, and thus the day
of the week, of each incident. Given that feeding programs operate over the weekend, it is
possible that a larger eﬀect will be observed early in the week.
These data include student demographics regarding school attended, free/reduced lunch
eligibility, race, age, gender, disability status, and grade. They also contain school char-
acteristics such as the student/teacher ratio; teacher degree, licensure, and tenure status;
as well as the percentage of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) targets the school met, and
the number of books per student at each school. For consistency, I use a time frame of
2006-2013 for all outcomes. This provides outcome data from 3 years pre- and 5 years post-
5To my knowledge there are no additional weekend feeding programs in this area. While it is possible
that there is a local eﬀort to supply a similar service to students at a particular school, even after numerous
phone and email conversations with organizers of all three feeding programs, I am not aware of any such
eﬀorts.
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observation of any BackPack program implementation in 2009.
2.2.3 Characteristics of BackPack and Non-Participating Schools
The BackPack enrollment data and the student outcomes and demographic data are merged
on school and year. It is not known which students actually participate in the BackPack
programs; for conﬁdentiality purposes, SHFB does not record the names of students enrolled
in their programs. The identity of a student may be known by school employees who may
have suggested the student enroll in the program, but there are no records kept by SHFB
identifying particular students. Because the students enrolled in a BackPack program are
very likely a subset of the free/reduced lunch eligible population, I treat all free/reduced
lunch eligible students at a school with an active BackPack program as potentially treated.
Table 2.3 (using the balanced panel of schools described in Table 2.1) provides com-
parisons across years between students at schools with a BackPack program to students at
non-participating schools for all outcomes and student characteristics. Overall, BackPack
schools are diﬀerent in many respects compared to non-participating schools and some of
these diﬀerences change over time. These facts, discussed below, are a signiﬁcant motivation
for the empirical strategy described in Section 2.3.
Table 2.3 shows that the average reading and math scores for students at BackPack
schools are marginally lower than for students at non-participating schools. This gap does
not appear to change substantially over time. Raw scores are reported and show that both
math and reading tests were signiﬁcantly rescaled in 2013. To make test scores comparable
across years in my analyses, I employ a common practice and standardize all scores to have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. In 2009, the BackPack schools had a slightly
larger percentage of students eligible for free/reduced lunch compared to non-participating
schools (61.1% compared to 52%, Table 2.3). This relationship changes substantially over
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time to where, in 2013, 78.4% of students are eligible for free/reduced lunch in BackPack
schools compared to 52.6% in non-participating schools. Similar to free/reduced lunch
eligibility, the percentage of white students at schools with BackPack programs declines
from 77.37% in 2009 to 34.85% in 2013 (with the %White at non-participating schools
remaining relatively constant around 60%). These two trends suggest that schools that are
early adopters of BackPack programs are relatively wealthy and relatively White compared
to the schools that adopt a program later.
School resources as measured by the student/teacher ratio appear comparable, but
slightly more abundant at non-participating schools). Although county unemployment is
high for both BackPack and non-participating schools in 2009, it is higher for the BackPack
schools. It appears as the communities recover from the recession, the BackPack schools are
disproportionately located in counties that recover more quickly (BackPack schools starting
at 12.84% and falling to 7.96% and non-participating schools starting at 11.35% and falling
to 8.11%).
In addition to the types of schools participating in the BackPack program changing, the
number of non-participating schools is changing over this time period, since the proportion
of students eligible for free and reduced lunch changes. Table 2.1 shows the number of
non-participating schools grows from 2009-2011 and then falls again through 2013.6 Some
schools that adopt a BackPack program in the later years were not even eligible for a
program in the earlier years. To account for this, I limit the main analysis (balance the
panel) to those schools eligible in 2009 (although the results are robust to balancing the
panel on other years and using an unbalanced panel). As a result, 13 schools that eventually
adopt a BackPack program are dropped from the analysis. The balanced panel consists of
200 schools in each of the 8 years examined. Table 2.1 shows the split of these 200 schools
6This is likely an artifact resulting from deﬁning non-participating schools as schools with >50%
free/reduced lunch eligible and the eﬀects of the recession on free/reduced lunch eligibility.
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between BackPack and non-participating schools over time. Similarly, students that ever
switch free/reduced lunch status may not represent either group well. To make a cleaner
comparison, I drop these students. There is also one school that leaves the BackPack
program during my period. Selection out of the program is equally as interesting as selection
into the program, but without more data, understanding what causes schools to leave the
program is diﬃcult. For purposes of the analysis, this school is dropped.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Because weekend feeding programs are not randomly assigned to schools, I use a quasi-
experimental approach employing a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology to identify the
eﬀects of program adoption on student outcomes. There are, however, substantial selection
issues to account for. In this section I discuss those selection issues as well as the empirical
strategies I employ to mitigate any potential bias.
2.3.1 Selection
Selection into a BackPack program is non-random. Students are selected to participate
in these programs based on perceived need and schools can self-identify or be invited to
adopt a BackPack program. Because of this, identifying the true eﬀect of these programs
is diﬃcult. Selection will take two main forms: student selection and community selection.
While both are issues, my empirical approach is better able to address student selection
than school selection. Below I describe plausible channels through which this non-random




Students are often identiﬁed to enroll into a BackPack program by a teacher, school nurse,
or other school employee and are identiﬁed based on need. This need is likely highly
correlated with student outcomes such as lower test scores, poorer attendance, and more
frequent behavioral incidents. Once students are identiﬁed, a permission letter is sent home
to obtain parental consent. A parent that is willing to give permission is likely to also be
willing to accept other forms of aid that could aﬀect their student's outcomes. Further, a
parent that is present in the evenings and able to sign a permission slip is also more likely
to be able to provide homework help and a more stable household environment. All of these
factors could also be associated with improved student outcomes for reasons unrelated to
the BackPack program.
Instead of using actual enrollment in a BackPack program, I proxy for enrollment by
using a student's eligibility for free/reduced lunch, which is based solely on household size
and income. This information is available in the NCERDC data and poses a substantially
diminished risk of endogeneity. This method identiﬁes the intent to treat (ITT) eﬀect rather
than the treatment on the treated (TOT). This estimated eﬀect is likely going to appear
smaller than the actual treatment eﬀect because it treats all free/reduced lunch eligible
students as receiving the program. Table 2.2 shows that the 25th and 75th percentiles of
take-up generally fall between 20% and 50%, giving a rough and approximate magnitude
of the diﬀerence between TOT and ITT estimates.
Community Selection
Community-level selection represents a greater risk of selection-related issues. To the degree
that the selection of participating schools is based on observable school characteristics,
unobserved school characteristics that do not change over time, or aﬀects both free/reduced
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lunch eligible and ineligible populations similarly, problems caused by community selection
can be controlled for. However, there are a number of unobserved channels through which
selection onto a BackPack program could be related to student outcomes. Additionally,
there is no a priori expected direction (positive or negative) of this selection.
It is possible that schools that adopt BackPack programs have particularly motivated
principals or other administrators. If this were the case, then schools would likely be taking
other steps to improve outcomes for free/reduced lunch eligible students and could result
in positive selection. Fortunately, this does not appear to be an issue. First, adopting a
program requires relatively little motivation and eﬀort on the part of the school. Most
of the burden lands on the community partners, which likely have less direct inﬂuence on
overall student outcomes other than through the BackPack program. Second, expansion of
BackPack programs across the schools in this study appears to be geographically correlated
(Figure 2.2). The majority of the expansion from 2009-2013 occurred in four counties,
Davidson, Forsyth, Guilford, and Yadkin. It appears that once a BackPack program enters
a school, the schools around it are more likely to adopt the program. If motivated princi-
pals were driving participation, one would expect a more random expansion of BackPack
programs.
It is also possible that schools that are exhibiting improving student outcomes are more
motivated and have the resources to adopt a BackPack program. Conversely, it could be
schools that are on the decline, and are in search of something to turn their trend around,
adopt BackPack programs. If this were the case, schools with BackPack programs should
look substantially diﬀerent from the schools that are potentially eligible but don't have a
program. Table 2.3 shows that, at least on the basis of math and reading test scores, this
does not seem to be the case. Although BackPack schools are shown to perform marginally
worse on both tests overall, this gap does not seem to be either growing or shrinking over
52
the time-frame of this study.
One pattern that does seem to be evident in the data is that program adoption appears
to start with wealthier, and racially less diverse schools, and move to poorer, more diverse
schools (remembering that all schools that adopt a BackPack program are relatively poor).
Table 2.3 shows in 2009 BackPack schools contained 61.1% eligible for free/reduced lunch
but by 2013 that ﬁgure had grown to 78.4%; the percent of students who are white in Back-
Pack schools drops from 77.37% in 2009 down to 34.85% in 2013. Given that community
involvement via the community partner is a signiﬁcant driver of program adoption, these
characteristics may be indicative of a community and parents who are more engaged in
education or who have relatively more abundant resources to support this new program.
Bias could arise if community and parental involvement is associated with improved student
outcomes independent of the BackPack program. Further, if the initiation of a weekend
feeding program is correlated with other time-varying community eﬀorts to improve child-
hood outcomes, such as more charitable giving, more volunteering with after-school and
weekend programs, or more parental eﬀort, additional bias could arise. Lastly bias could
arise if, adopting a program serves as a catalyst for other school-level improvements, is
correlated with other community eﬀorts to improve outcomes, or crowds out other eﬀorts
that are unobserved in the data.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Because BackPack programs are not adopted randomly, I employ a quasi-experimental
approach using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology. In this case, the treated group is
the free/reduced lunch eligible student population at schools with an active BackPack
program. This speciﬁcation allows non-free/reduced lunch eligible students at BackPack
schools and free/reduced lunch students at non-participating schools to act as a control
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groups. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach therefore automatically accounts for factors
that change over time, but aﬀect both free/reduced lunch eligible and ineligible students
similarly. Additionally, I incorporate grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. These controls
will account for any factors that do not change over time. After employing the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence and ﬁxed eﬀects approach, the only variation that should be left is the variation
that changes over time and aﬀects free/reduced lunch eligible students diﬀerently than
free/reduced lunch ineligible students at schools with a BackPack program.
The simplest model is a descriptive diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model. This model is akin
to a simple diﬀerence in means for free/reduced lunch eligible vs ineligible before and after
adoption of a program and takes the form:
Yits = β1 + β2FRLit + β3ActiveProgramts
+ β4FRLit ∗ActiveProgramts + its (2.1)
Here, Yits represents four separate student outcomes: math and reading test scores,
number of days absent, and number of disciplinary acts. FRL is a dichotomous variable
equal to 1 when student, i, is eligible for free/reduced lunch in year, t. Active Program
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when school, s, has an active BackPack program in
year, t. One could also employ a continuous measure of program intensity to identify a
treatment eﬀect. Table 2.2 shows that there is a large discrete jump in program intensity
(Intensity = #Enrolled/#FRLEligible), with moderate growth following rather than
consistent growth throughout. Given this is the case, I focus the analysis on a dichotomous
measure of program adoption for simplicity of exposition.7
7For completeness, I also report the main results using Intensity rather than the dichotomous BackPack
measure in Appendix 2.B. These results are discussed in the robustness checks section.
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In this model, the treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed by the interaction between FRL and
Active Program. That is, β4 represents the independent eﬀect of being in the potentially-
treated population of free/reduced lunch eligible students in a given year and school in
which a BackPack program was in place.
The simple model provides the before/after, treatment/control comparison and serves
as a baseline for more complex models. There are other observable characteristics that may
play an important role in both determining outcomes as well as the decisions to adopt a
BackPack program. A more complete model takes the form:
Yits = β1 + β2FRLit + β3ActiveProgramts
+ β4FRLit ∗ActiveProgramts + β5Yis,t−1 + β6Xit
+ β7Zst + β8Uct + β9Gradet + β10Y eart + β11Schools + its (2.2)
Here, I incorporate additional information where Yis,t−1 represents the lagged depen-
dent variable. This can be considered as a stock of human capital and accounts for prior
inputs to students' human capital production.8 The variable, X, represents a set of student
characteristics, Z represents school characteristics, U represents the county, c, unemploy-
ment rate,9 while Grade, Year, and School represent a set of grade, year, and school ﬁxed
eﬀects respectively. In Equation 2, β4 remains the parameter of interest.
A key assumption implicit in Equation 2 is that the control variables measured in X, Z,
U, and the ﬁxed eﬀects for Grade, Year, and School, aﬀect both free/reduced lunch eligible
and ineligible populations equally. There is no need to restrict the model in this way. To
8I also estimate this equation using lagged versions of all outcome variables (math scores, reading scores,
absences, and disciplinary acts) this does not substantially change the results compared to including only
the lagged dependent variable, and is discussed further in the Robustness Section.
9Unemployment is derived from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and varies by county and year.
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allow greater ﬂexibility, my main model of interest splits the data on free/reduced lunch
eligibility and estimates Equation 2 for eligible and ineligible student separately.
Yits = γ1 + γ2ActiveProgramts + γ3Yis,t−1 + γ4Xi + γ5Zst
+ β6Uct + γ7Gradet + γ8Y eart + γ9Schools + its (2.3)
Given that Equation 3 is estimated separately for free/reduced lunch eligible and in-
eligible students the free/reduced lunch explanatory variable has been removed and the
parameter of interest is now γ2. Speciﬁcally, how this parameter varies across the two
groups (eligible and ineligible students). This model is the least restrictive of the three as it
allows for all parameters (including ﬁxed eﬀects) to vary by free/reduced lunch eligibility.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This analysis provides a discussion of the models from most restrictive to least restrictive
and shows the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models are insuﬃcient to capture the complexities of
the relationships studied. I ﬁrst discuss the estimation of the math and reading regressions
in their entirety, then move on to the absence and disciplinary acts regressions. Then I
provide a brief account of the many robustness checks explored in the analysis. Because
some results are surprising, I end with a discussion of a number of plausible explanations
for these ﬁndings accompanied by supporting analyses.
2.4.1 Results
Table 2.4 shows the estimated coeﬃcients for the three models using student tests scores as
the dependent variables. Table 2.5 shows coeﬃcients for the three models with behavioral
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measures as the dependent variable.10 While discussing the outcomes, I will refer to pa-
rameter estimates as beneﬁcial and detrimental with reference to the generally desired
direction. That is, an increase in math and reading scores will be referred to as beneﬁcial
and a decrease in absences and disciplinary acts will also be referred to as beneﬁcial (and
vice versa).
Beginning with the simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DD) regressions for math and reading
scores (Table 2.4) there seems to be a statistically signiﬁcant beneﬁcial association between
the presence of a BackPack program and math scores but an insigniﬁcant (detrimental)
relationship with reading scores (Table 2.4, columns 1 and 5). Using a more standard DD
approach and controlling for observable student, school, and county characteristics, and
ﬁxed eﬀects for grade, year, and school, parameter estimates become much smaller and
insigniﬁcant for both (Table 2.4, columns 2 and 6). Relaxing the restriction that all param-
eter estimates be equal across the free/reduced lunch eligible and ineligible populations, the
parameter estimates shrink further and remain insigniﬁcant (Table 2.4, columns 3-4 and
7-8). It is not uncommon to ﬁnd inconsistent results in reading scores as seen here. For
completeness I report reading scores here and elsewhere, but they will receive minimal dis-
cussion. Although the simple descriptive DD suggests BackPack programs might improve
math scores, these ﬁndings do not hold up under more rigorous models.
The simple DD model also suggests a beneﬁcial relationship between the BackPack
program and both behavioral outcomes, absences and disciplinary acts (Table 2.5, columns
1 and 5). In the DD model with a full set of controls and ﬁxed eﬀects, both behavioral
outcomes and adoption of a BackPack program continue to show a statistically signiﬁcant
beneﬁcial relationship (Table 2.5, columns 2 and 6). Splitting the model by free/reduced
lunch eligibility provides the least restrictive model and allows all coeﬃcients to diﬀer
10For simplicity, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report only the parameters of interest. For completeness, Tables 2.12
and 2.13 report all model coeﬃcients.
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between the two groups.11 In this model, the association between the BackPack program
and both behavioral outcomes turns detrimental and statistically signiﬁcant (Table 2.5,
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). The program appears to be associated with an increase of 0.303
absences and 0.1095 disciplinary acts.
It appears that both absences and behavioral incidents outcomes are higher for free/reduced
lunch eligible students at BackPack schools compared to other students. The association
with math and reading scores are insigniﬁcant.
2.4.2 Robustness
This section veriﬁes that the results are mostly insensitive to sample selection, dependent
variable speciﬁcation, and model speciﬁcation. All tables are reported in Appendix 2.B.
The main analysis uses a panel of schools balanced on 2009, I also estimate the models
using two diﬀerent panels: a balanced panel keeping the schools that were eligible in 2006
and an unbalanced panel of schools (which includes the school that leaves the BackPack
program). I repeat the analysis while dropping the schools that eventually adopt one of
the other programs. I re-estimate the regressions using raw scores instead of standardized
scores. Additionally, I investigate the use of diﬀerent lag structures: including all four lagged
outcomes in each regression and including no lags. I also estimate the above-described
models omitting the school and county characteristics (leaving only student characteristics).
None of the above alternatives aﬀect my results qualitatively.
I decompose the cause for the reversal of the estimated eﬀects in the behavioral out-
comes. Equation 2 restricts student, school, and county characteristics and school and year
ﬁxed eﬀects to be equal across free/reduced lunch eligible and ineligible students. When
11A Chow test suggests this is the correct speciﬁcation and is supported by the observation that the
estimated coeﬃcients on the control variables diﬀer substantially in some cases (Table 2.12, columns 3, 4,
7, and 8).
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I relax either restriction, the signs reverse. This ﬁnding suggests that it is both student
characteristics and observable and unobservable school qualities that are driving the result.
Including the students who ever switch free/reduced lunch status makes the associ-
ation with math scores become marginally signiﬁcant (remaining of the beneﬁcial sign).
These students are not well representative of the students receiving the BackPack program.
Further, a student moving out of free/reduced lunch eligibility may be experiencing other
improvements in their life due to increasing family income that may be unrelated to the
BackPack program. For these reasons, excluding the free/reduced lunch switchers is likely
more appropriate.
Exploring the day of the week data associated with the disciplinary acts, I perform the
main analysis for disciplinary acts separately for Monday, Wednesday and Friday. This
analysis shows the statistically signiﬁcant detrimental association with disciplinary acts is
driven primarily by a higher incidence on Mondays and Fridays for those the free/reduced
lunch eligible students compared to the ineligible students. This makes sense particularly
on Fridays because the students need to be in school to receive the pack. Unfortunately,
the absence data are not rich enough to show how attendance patterns vary through the
week.
Lastly, I explore the use of a continuous measure of Program Intensity (discussed in
Table 2.2) rather than the dichotomous measure. This speciﬁcation shows a reversal of
many of the ﬁndings discussed above. The detrimental association with both behavioral
outcomes becomes insigniﬁcant and the beneﬁcial association with math scores becomes
signiﬁcant. However, this speciﬁcation is not robust to many of the robustness checks
discussed in this section, with both signiﬁcance and parameter signs ﬂuctuating. In future
work, it may be beneﬁcial to explore this measure further.
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2.4.3 Discussion
The ﬁndings from Section 5.1, that the BackPack program has no statistically-signiﬁcant
eﬀect on test scores and appears to have detrimental eﬀects on behavior and absences, are
counter to what one might expect and what participants in the program might hope. In
this section, I discuss a number of possible explanations and initial empirical exploration
for estimating a negative association between adoption of a BackPack program and the
outcomes examined in this study. The issues arising here are similar to issues in estimating
the eﬀect of the NSLP. Dunifon and Kowaleski-Jones (2004) note that identifying a program
eﬀect may be diﬃcult because families might substitute their own funds away from food
provision in the presence of the program, leaving overall intake unchanged. It could also be
that despite increased food intake, the nutritional value of the food provided by the NSLP
may not be suﬃcient to show improvement in measurable outcomes.
Household Leakages
One possible explanation of the detrimental eﬀect involves household leakages (actions
taken by the household in response to the program that either detract from or counteract
the eﬀects of the program). In the case of absences, BackPack programs might reduce the
reliance on school-provided food such as school lunch or school breakfast. If more weekend
food means less reliance on school-provided food then it is possible that students have less
incentive to attend school or that parents have less incentive to make sure their children
arrive on time. Unfortunately, there are no good data with which to test this theory.
However, given that the BackPack program disproportionately serves lower grades, this
is likely a smaller problem than if the program were targeting older students with more
autonomy regarding attendance.
Another concern is that the food is not being consumed by the students themselves. It
60
is entirely possible that family members not on the program consume some of the food.
Alternatively, parents could substitute away from food they might otherwise have provided
the student. In this case, the student's consumption of food does not increase, but changes
sources. Any of these possibilities could diminish or reverse a beneﬁcial eﬀect of the pro-
gram.
School Composition
It is also possible that a BackPack program is causing a change in composition within
the schools that adopt a program. If this program is viewed as desirable by parents and
guardians, then perhaps more free/reduced lunch students will be retained by schools with
BackPack programs compared to that same school prior to adoption and compared to
non-participating schools. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicate free/reduced lunch eligible students
exhibit lower test scores and increased absences and disciplinary acts compared to ineligible
students (Tables 2.4 and 2.5, columns 3, 4, 7, and 8). If the composition of the students
changes as a result of the BackPack program such that participating schools retain more
troubled or marginal students, then we could see a detrimental eﬀect. However, this reten-
tion could be a good thing. It means more academic stability for the student if they are
able to stay in the same school for longer periods rather than moving from school to school.
It means greater family stability if the family doesn't move as often or if the student is able
to live with the same family members for longer stretches of time.
Initially there seems to be some evidence that supports the notion that BackPack schools
retain more free/reduced lunch students. Table 2.6 shows students who ever switch schools
from one year to the next during my observed time frame as a percent of the school size.
Table 2.6 indicates that fewer free/reduced lunch eligible students move from BackPack
schools than do free/reduced lunch eligible students from non-participating schools. How-
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ever, we also see that fewer free/reduced lunch ineligible students move from BackPack
schools as well. A simple Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence regression of percent movers on Back-
Pack participation indicates that while fewer free/reduced lunch eligible students leave
BackPack schools (Table 2.7, column 1), this is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the pattern
seen in the free/reduced lunch ineligible students (Table 2.7, column 2).
Community Selection
The BackPack program is not a government program and it is not necessarily the neediest
schools that implement the programs. It is true a school must be relatively poor to adopt a
BackPack program in that they must have at least 50% of the student body participating in
the free/reduced lunch program. In my empirical analysis, I have controlled for time-varying
and time-invariant school characteristics and for time-varying student characteristics that
aﬀect free/reduced lunch eligible and ineligible students equally. The variation that remains
varies over time and aﬀects eligible and ineligible students diﬀerently. In this section I
discuss two possible explanations for non-BackPack phenomena that could be driving the
result. First, a school or community could anticipate tough times ahead and choose to adopt
a BackPack program as a way of mitigating those hardships (negative selection). Second,
the adopters of a program could be relatively wealthy compared and better equipped to
weather the storm (positive selection).12
During the time-frame of this study, the economy was experiencing recession. If a
community knows the economic situation overall is deteriorating, it may take steps to
moderate the strain, particularly for the children. In a study examining the determinants of
BackPack program adoption, Kurtz (2015) (Chapter 3) ﬁnds worsening local unemployment
12A third explanation could be community program crowd-out. Because these BackPack programs are
funded largely by the local community, adoption of a BackPack program may come at the expense of an
alternative community program. I do not have data to test for this, but the possibility remains.
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is a signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting the probability of program adoption. Further, it is likely
that the recession hit poorer communities hardest. If these communities choose to adopt a
program then the model may be picking up some of the eﬀect of the recession hitting poorer
communities that is not accounted for by other observable characteristics. This negative
selection could bias the estimated results.
The community partner of each school is responsible for securing continual funding, as
well as maintaining volunteers to obtain, store, pack, and distribute the food each week.
This suggests it could be the schools in relatively wealthy communities that implement the
programs (at least at ﬁrst). The trends in free/reduced lunch eligibility (Table 2.3) show
schools that adopted the BackPack in the ﬁrst few years are relatively wealthy with a low
percentage of students eligible for free/reduced lunch and high take-up rates (Table 2.2) and
schools that adopted later tend to be poorer with a relatively high percentage of students
eligible for free/reduced lunch and relatively low take-rates.13
To examine the potential for a diﬀerential eﬀect of the BackPack program for early
adopters vs. late adopters, I split the sample into two groups by the timing of their program
adoption. Early adopters are deﬁned as schools that adopt the BackPack program in the
ﬁrst two years (2009 or 2010) and compared only to the schools that never adopt (not to late
adopters). Late adopters are deﬁned as schools that adopt the BackPack program after 2010
and also compared to the schools that never adopt (not to early adopters). Tables 2.8 and
2.9 present results from re-estimating Equation 3 for all outcomes (where the sample is now
split on free/reduced lunch eligibility and early/late adoption). This analysis shows that
the detrimental and signiﬁcant association of the behavioral outcomes with the BackPack
program were being driven by the late adopters (Table 2.9). The association between both
13This not only suggests relatively wealthy schools adopt, but that poorer schools might drop. Although
there is one school that drops the BackPack program during my time frame, it is excluded when the sample
is balanced on 2009.
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behavioral outcomes and the BackPack program for the early adopters appears beneﬁcial
however statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the diﬀerence between early and late adopters
for disciplinary acts does appear statically signiﬁcant.
Selection is a problem when factors other than the program aﬀect both student outcomes
and the decision to adopt a program. As a more thorough test for community selection,
I employ a false-start-date analysis. To do this, I replace the ActiveProgramst variable
(denoting if school, s, has an active BackPack program in year, t) with ActivePrograms,t+2
(a two-year lead). If there is no selection occurring, one should ﬁnd no association between
the outcomes and a two-year lead of program adoption. Finding a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect associated with the two-year lead is evidence of selection, in that the conditions in the
school/community that led to the decision to adopt a program are also conditions aﬀecting
student outcomes. I ﬁnd substantial evidence to suggest this may be the case (Tables 2.10
and 2.11).
When examining math scores I see a very similar pattern and similar coeﬃcient magni-
tudes compared to the unaltered analysis. With the two-year lead I still ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant estimated eﬀect in the the simple DD speciﬁcation. This is strong support for
employing more complex models. When examining absences, I again see a very similar pat-
tern to the unaltered analysis in that the simple and full DD models suggest a statistically
signiﬁcant beneﬁcial eﬀect of the two-year lead and the split models show a statistically
signiﬁcant detrimental eﬀect (mimicking the unaltered analysis). This suggests the detri-
mental eﬀect shown on absences may be, in part, due to negative community selection. It
is important to note that that this association is not necessarily causal. If the unaltered
analysis is being driven by spurious correlations then it is possible that the 2-year lead is
driven by the same spurious correlations. However, if community selection were driving the
results, these are the results one would expect to ﬁnd with the 2-year lead.
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I see a slightly diﬀerent, yet similarly concerning pattern when examining disciplinary
acts (Table 2.11). Again, the simple and full DD show statistically signiﬁcant beneﬁcial
eﬀects of the two-year lead. In the split models, however, the signiﬁcant beneﬁcial result
persists. This suggests the signiﬁcant detrimental eﬀect seen on disciplinary acts in the
unaltered analysis may not be driven by negative selection. However, a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the two-year lead is still troubling and suggests either a strong spurious correlation or a
more complex relationship than is currently captured by this study.
Qualitative Discussions
We can infer a great deal from the data that are available. However, in seeking a deeper
understanding of how these programs operate, grow, and spread, I have spoken with the
Director of Childhood Hunger Programs at the Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwest
North Carolina, Daisy Rodriguez (D. Rodriguez, interviews, July 22, 2014 and September
18, 2013). During our conversation she identiﬁed three main factors that aﬀect the adoption
of a BackPack program at a particular school.
First, and most importantly, is the sustainability of funding. The Second Harvest Food
Bank of Northwest North Carolina will help the partner organization with funding for the
ﬁrst year but it is the responsibility of that partner organization to sustain funding going
forward. Sustained funding comes from a sustained commitment from the community
to support these programs. For some partner organizations, sustained funding can be a
major challenge and poor prospects may prohibit an organization from initiating a program.
Second, running a BackPack program in a community is a signiﬁcant time commitment. The
community partner is responsible not only for raising funds, but also for collecting, storing,
packing, and distributing the food each week. Just as smaller agencies may ﬁnd funding
hard to come by, maintaining volunteers to complete all necessary tasks can be a challenge.
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Additionally, a program needs the buy-in from the school administrators whose time is also
limited. Third, awareness and support are signiﬁcant factors. Both of these factors lead
to obvious geographical correlations. A school adopting a program in a particular area can
increase awareness of the program and can provide support to other communities in the
area making adoption more likely in surrounding communities.
Factors 1 and 2 support the notion that wealthier areas are better able to utilize a
BackPack program. Funding is easier to ﬁnd, and sustain and it is likely that volunteer
hours are more available. Factor 3 suggests that those communities that did not adopt in
the ﬁrst few years may not have heard of the program or were unable to organize themselves
to utilize the program. Poorer outcomes in the later-adopting schools suggests that perhaps
these later adopters were not ready to support a program. Further, the BackPack program
is not like comparable programs (such as school lunch and school breakfast programs).
The community must support and fund these programs rather than the government, so
it is possible that schools that adopt later are doing so with fewer resources to sustain
the program and/or at the expense of an alternative program that might be beneﬁcial to
students as well.
2.5 Conclusion
While there is weak descriptive evidence to suggest that BackPack programs improve out-
comes, a more careful approach that accounts for selection and endogeneity shows this
ﬁnding disappears for math scores and reverses for behavioral outcomes. Selection, both
positive and negative, may be playing a role in these ﬁndings. There is some evidence
to support the idea that early adopters of the BackPack program see an improvement in
disciplinary acts relative to late adopters. This is evidence of positive selection in that early
adopters of the BackPack programs appear to be relatively wealthy communities and as
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such, perhaps are better able to utilize program beneﬁts.
Negative selection appears to be at play in that poorer schools may adopt in anticipation
of harder times ahead. Negative selection may also manifest in other ways not captured
by this analysis as evidenced by the similarities between the eﬀects of the true adoption
date and two-year lead of adoption. It could also be that BackPack programs are causing a
decreased reliance on school-provided food and thus some students attend school less often
or that households substitute funds away from food provision when a child is enrolled.
My study provides key information in understanding how these relatively new and
unstudied BackPack programs function. It also provides an important case study of how
non-governmental social welfare programs operate and are able to aﬀect a community. In
furthering this understanding, a deeper understanding of the selection processes governing
the adoption, expansion, and geographical spread of these programs is necessary. In future
work, I plan to incorporate additional years of BackPack program adoption and expansion
to explore the possibility for a lagged or cumulative eﬀect and additional controls for the
local economic climate to better account for program selection. I also plan to incorporate
data from other weekend feeding programs in North Carolina and New Hampshire to explore
selection issues and expansion in order to better understand how these programs can aﬀect




Table 2.1: BackPack Program Schools as Percent of Eligible Schools, By County and Year*
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
NP BP % NP BP % NP BP % NP BP % NP BP %
Alamance 14 17 17 18 1 5.3 16 1 5.9
Alexander 5 1 16.7 6 1 14.3 6 1 14.3 6 1 14.3 7
Alleghany 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3
Ashe 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25
Caldwell 13 1 7.1 16 3 15.8 16 3 15.8 17 4 19 13 4 23.5
Davidson 10 2 16.7 17 3 15 13 8 38.1 13 9 40.9 11 9 45
Davie 3 5 6 6 6
Forsyth 35 42 36 5 12.2 29 14 32.6 17 23 57.5
Guilford 49 62 1 1.6 56 7 11.1 52 15 22.4 46 16 25.8
Iredell 12 17 1 5.6 16 2 11.1 15 3 16.7 13 3 18.8
Randolph 12 16 1 5.9 16 1 5.9 17 1 5.6 15 1 6.3
Rockingham 14 1 6.7 15 2 11.8 15 2 11.8 16 2 11.1 14 3 17.6
Stokes 2 1 33.3 8 1 11.1 8 1 11.1 9 2 18.2 8 2 20
Surry 9 1 10 12 1 7.7 13 2 13.3 13 2 13.3 13 2 13.3
Watauga 1 2 3 4 4
Wilkes 16 16 15 1 6.3 15 1 6.3 15 1 6.3
Yadkin 3 7 2 22.2 6 4 40 5 5 50 4 5 55.6
Total 203 9 4.2 263 18 6.4 247 39 13.6 240 62 20.5 207 72 25.8
Balanced Panel** 192 8 4 185 15 7.5 170 30 15 150 50 25 141 59 29.5
*NP denotes a school with >50% free/reduced lunch eligible students without a BackPack program
**Balanced Panel: limited to those schools eligible in 2009
Note: Highlighted rows designate the main four counties by percentage and number of BackPack programs in 2013.
Note: The 2008-09 school year is referred to as 2009; similar nomenclature is followed for subsequent years.
69
Table 2.2: Program Intensity* by Program Year
All Schools
Program Year N Mean Med. 25% 75%
1 58 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.41
2 48 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.44
3 28 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.50
4 13 0.50 0.32 0.29 0.52
5 6 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.39
Early Adopters (Adopt in 2009 or 2010)
Program Year N Mean Med. 25% 75%
1 12 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.57
2 13 0.43 0.30 0.26 0.41
3 13 0.49 0.31 0.25 0.46
4 13 0.50 0.32 0.29 0.52
5 6 0.39 0.21 0.31 0.39
Late Adopters (Adopt after 2010)
Program Year N Mean Med. 25% 75%
1 46 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.30
2 35 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.44
3 15 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.51
*Intensity = #Enrolled/#FRL Eligible
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Students at Non-Participating Schools vs. Students at BackPack Schools
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
NP BP NP BP NP BP NP BP NP BP
N= 74243 1776 53042 2836 49695 6375 44218 11606 40633 13685
Outcomes
Math Score 353.1 352.4 354.8 351.9 355.4 351.8 355.8 352.0 448.0 446.5
Reading Score 348.1 346.2 349.8 346.3 350.4 345.7 351.0 345.9 449.1 443.3
% Absences > 0 88.00 91.50 90.84 92.10 91.77 92.49 89.70 89.38 92.96 93.76
Abs (mean| > 0) 7.13 7.23 7.62 7.28 7.69 7.38 7.29 6.59 8.13 7.96
% Dis. Acts > 0 15.95 9.74 15.60 8.07 16.79 12.88 15.68 16.28 14.87 18.71
Acts (mean | > 0) 3.40 2.41 3.43 2.18 3.64 2.71 3.51 3.57 2.97 3.11
Student
% FRL Eligible 52.00 61.10 51.77 65.29 52.61 70.26 52.89 76.08 52.76 78.40
% Female 49.32 49.41 49.52 49.29 49.44 49.39 49.29 50.05 49.51 50.01
% White 57.92 77.37 60.74 66.17 60.61 51.49 61.83 39.42 62.12 34.85
% Disabled 13.58 17.68 12.35 14.55 12.14 13.78 11.94 13.06 12.07 13.32
Age 11.96 10.95 11.91 10.67 11.98 10.74 12.03 10.94 12.10 10.98
School
% w/ Other Program* 9.12 0.00 9.25 0.00 14.38 2.05 14.52 6.18 14.78 6.87
Student Tchr. Ratio 14.67 13.91 15.28 15.21 15.44 14.37 15.86 14.11 15.86 14.11
% Tchr. Board Cert. 11.49 17.13 13.15 15.01 14.08 13.71 15.53 11.89 15.53 11.20
% Tchr. Adv. Deg. 26.40 26.18 27.83 28.76 28.30 27.34 29.87 28.15 30.02 30.96
% Tchr. Fully Lic. 95.83 100.00 97.17 98.27 98.28 98.22 98.51 98.81 97.71 98.08
% AYP Targets Met 98.62 99.02 96.11 95.28 82.13 77.74 88.56 79.76 87.82 79.94
% Tchr. 1-year Turn. 11.39 5.43 10.02 8.46 9.65 10.42 10.74 13.04 12.08 12.79
% Tchr. 1-3 Years 20.70 22.30 18.01 18.54 16.88 18.59 15.47 18.39 16.57 20.56
Books Per Student 19.25 27.27 19.81 25.17 19.51 24.75 19.83 24.72 19.79 24.37
County
Unemp. Rate 11.35 12.84 11.58 12.67 10.62 10.96 9.50 9.47 8.11 7.96
*Other programs did not begin until 2011, this denotes if the school ever had an Other Program
Note: NP denotes a school with >50% free/reduced lunch eligible students without a BackPack program.
Note: Summary statistics based on a 2009 balanced panel of schools.
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Table 2.4: Math and Reading Score Regressions: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.643*** 0.0210*** 0.0237*** 0.0220*** 0.875*** -0.000784 0.00194* 0.00126
(0.0137) (0.00297) (0.00194) (0.00372) (0.0134) (0.00170) (0.00111) (0.00215)
FRL Eligible -0.165*** -0.0348*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0324*** -0.0223*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.000889) 0.00170 (0.00362) (0.000511) 0.00069
FRL*BackPack 0.227*** 0.00328 0.00420 -0.0224 0.00170 0.00242
(0.0152) (0.00290) (0.0148) (0.00166)
Table 2.5: Absence and Disciplinary Act Regressions: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
FRL Eligible -0.118 0.550*** 0.347*** 0.0436 -0.0365 0.165*** 0.128*** 0.0180
(0.0955) (0.110) (0.0778) (0.109) (0.0251) (0.0317) (0.0240) (0.0265)
BackPack 1.829*** 1.588*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.443*** 0.261*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0258) (0.0327) 0.303** (0.00801) (0.0101) 0.1095***
FRL*BackPack -0.403*** -0.345*** 0.1340 -0.0704** -0.0627** 0.0357
(0.106) (0.108) (0.0278) (0.0295)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Estimated BackPack eﬀect highlighted in grey.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics. Coeﬃcient estimates are reported in
Tables 2.12 and 2.13.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.6: Year-to-Year School Movers as Percent of School Size
Variable Obs Mean SD
FRL Movers
BackPack Schools 200 0.12 0.099
NP Schools 1670 0.169 0.102
Non-FRL Movers
BackPack Schools 200 0.041 0.063
NP Schools 1670 0.082 0.071
Table 2.7: Simple Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence %Free/Reduced Lunch Mover Regressions
(1) (2)






adj. R2 0.021 0.032
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
*BackPack is the same dichotomous variable used
in earlier regressions
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Table 2.8: Test Score Regressions Split by Free/Reduced Lunch Eligibility: Early vs. Late Adopters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
Early Early Late Late Early Early Late Late
FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.0119** -0.000499 -0.00179 -0.00308 0.00286 0.00693* 0.00192 -0.000949
(0.00494) (0.00632) (0.00253) (0.00549) (0.00284) (0.00367) (0.00146) (0.00320)
Diﬀ: FRL - Non FRL 0.0123 0.003 -0.00407 0.0019
(0.0080) (0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0035)
Diﬀ: Early - Late 0.0093 -0.00597
(0.0100) (0.0058)
Table 2.9: Absence and Disciplinary Act Regressions Split by Free/Reduced Lunch Eligibility: Early vs. Late Adopters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abs Abs Abs Abs Dis Dis Dis Dis
Early Early Late Late Early Early Late Late
FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.0710 0.00576 0.236** -0.213 -0.106 -0.0333 0.188*** -0.00460
(0.214) (0.193) (0.108) (0.169) (0.0914) (0.0598) (0.0331) (0.0400)
Diﬀ: FRL - Non FRL -0.0768 0.449** -0.0727 0.1926***
0.2882 0.2006 0.1092 0.0519
Diﬀ: Early - Late -0.5258 -0.2653**
0.3511 0.1209
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Estimated BackPack eﬀect highlighted in grey.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.10: Base Models with False-Start-Date: Math and Reading Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BP 2-year Lead -0.0616*** -0.000387 0.00256 0.00558 0.521*** -0.00432** 0.00165 -0.000563
(0.00393) (0.00323) (0.00243) (0.00477) (0.00977) (0.00189) (0.00142) (0.00281)
FRL Eligible -0.230*** -0.0341*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ -0.0197*** -0.0230*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00131) (0.00103) -0.0036 (0.00326) (0.000603) 0.0016
FRL*2-year Lead 0.0281*** 0.00369 0.0054 -0.0690*** 0.00940*** 0.0032
(0.00444) (0.00288) (0.0110) (0.00169)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Estimated BackPack eﬀect highlighted in grey.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.11: Base Models with False-Start-Date: Absences and Disciplinary Acts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ABS ABS ABS ABS Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BP 2-year Lead -0.289*** 0.980*** 0.752*** 0.138 -0.0293 0.0575 -0.163*** 0.0511
(0.0900) (0.127) (0.104) (0.147) (0.0245) (0.0420) (0.0395) (0.0456)
FRL Eligible 1.892*** 1.677*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.477*** 0.274*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0300) (0.0399) 0.614*** (0.00992) (0.0132) -0.211***
FRL*2-year Lead -0.701*** -0.412*** 0.18 -0.176*** -0.184*** 0.06
(0.102) (0.113) (0.0276) (0.0328)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Estimated BackPack eﬀect highlighted in grey.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics.
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.12: Math and Reading Score Regressions: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility  Full Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.643*** 0.0210*** 0.0237*** 0.0220*** 0.875*** -0.000784 0.00194* 0.00126
(0.0137) (0.00297) (0.00194) (0.00372) (0.0134) (0.00170) (0.00111) (0.00215)
FRL Eligible -0.165*** -0.0348*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0324*** -0.0223*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.000889) 0.00170 (0.00362) (0.000511) 0.00069
FRL*BackPack 0.227*** 0.00328 0.00420 -0.0224 0.00170 0.00242
(0.0152) (0.00290) (0.0148) (0.00166)
Dep. Var (t-1) 0.0237*** 0.0232*** 0.0244*** 0.0131*** 0.0130*** 0.0132***
(0.0000427) (0.0000529) (0.0000739) (0.0000242) (0.0000291) (0.0000442)
Female 0.00540*** 0.00440*** 0.00696*** 0.00352*** 0.00315*** 0.00427***
(0.000661) (0.000805) (0.00115) (0.000380) (0.000460) (0.000663)
White 0.00663*** 0.000810 0.0127*** 0.00923*** 0.00665*** 0.0108***
(0.000887) (0.00108) (0.00164) (0.000511) (0.000620) (0.000948)
Disabled -0.0184*** -0.0239*** -0.00897*** -0.0154*** -0.0184*** -0.00882***
(0.00104) (0.00126) (0.00190) (0.000603) (0.000724) (0.00110)
Age -0.0153*** -0.0169*** -0.0117*** -0.00793*** -0.00888*** -0.00474***
(0.000597) (0.000698) (0.00116) (0.000342) (0.000398) (0.000670)
Other Prog. 0.0198*** 0.0173*** 0.0292*** -0.00163 -0.000163 -0.00554*
(0.00285) (0.00335) (0.00547) (0.00163) (0.00192) (0.00315)
Schl: Stud./Teach -0.00524*** -0.00405*** -0.00750*** -0.00180*** -0.00124*** -0.00263***
(0.000452) (0.000562) (0.000771) (0.000259) (0.000321) (0.000445)
Schl: %Board Cert. 0.0256** 0.0170 0.0368** 0.0155** 0.0279*** -0.00592
(0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0175) (0.00604) (0.00754) (0.0101)
Schl: %Adv. Deg. 0.0105 0.00526 0.0243* 0.00194 -0.00380 0.0165**
(0.00786) (0.00944) (0.0144) (0.00451) (0.00539) (0.00833)
Continued on next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
Schl: %Full Lic. 0.0306*** 0.0492*** 0.00606 -0.0249*** -0.0133* -0.0481***
(0.0110) (0.0133) (0.0201) (0.00632) (0.00757) (0.0116)
Schl: %AYP Met 0.156*** 0.175*** 0.112*** 0.0432*** 0.0465*** 0.0266***
(0.00386) (0.00468) (0.00690) (0.00222) (0.00267) (0.00398)
Schl: Book/Stud. 0.0000272*** 0.0000271*** 0.0000217 -0.00000592* -0.00000231 -0.0000216*
(0.00000603) (0.00000639) (0.0000202) (0.00000346) (0.00000365) (0.0000116)
Schl: %1yr Turn. -0.0728*** -0.0627*** -0.0841*** -0.0113*** -0.00781* -0.00886
(0.00652) (0.00786) (0.0117) (0.00374) (0.00449) (0.00677)
Schl: %Tch. 1-3 Yr. -0.0192*** -0.0113 -0.0409*** -0.00646* -0.00820* -0.00298
(0.00640) (0.00773) (0.0116) (0.00367) (0.00441) (0.00669)
County Unemp. 0.00315*** 0.00332*** 0.00397*** 0.00129*** 0.000737 0.00447***
(0.000810) (0.00102) (0.00135) (0.000465) (0.000580) (0.000780)
Observations 375232 213394 147117 66277 375232 213394 147117 66277
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.981 0.982 0.979 0.057 0.990 0.989 0.990
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.13: Absence and Disciplinary Act Regressions: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility  Full Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
FRL Eligible -0.118 0.550*** 0.347*** 0.0436 -0.0365 0.165*** 0.128*** 0.0180
(0.0955) (0.110) (0.0778) (0.109) (0.0251) (0.0317) (0.0240) (0.0265)
BackPack 1.829*** 1.588*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.443*** 0.261*** ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0258) (0.0327) 0.303** (0.00801) (0.0101) 0.1095***
FRL*BackPack -0.403*** -0.345*** 0.1340 -0.0704** -0.0627** 0.0357
(0.106) (0.108) (0.0278) (0.0295)
Dep. Var (t-1) 0.637*** 0.626*** 0.660*** 0.588*** 0.571*** 0.590***
(0.00200) (0.00244) (0.00348) (0.00248) (0.00293) (0.00495)
Female -0.00952 -0.0103 0.00331 -0.222*** -0.270*** -0.121***
(0.0246) (0.0323) (0.0336) (0.00751) (0.00994) (0.00816)
White 1.247*** 1.589*** 0.774*** -0.0721*** -0.0205 -0.0875***
(0.0332) (0.0438) (0.0480) (0.0100) (0.0133) (0.0116)
Disabled 0.273*** 0.347*** 0.132** 0.101*** 0.0978*** 0.0733***
(0.0384) (0.0496) (0.0557) (0.0120) (0.0152) (0.0148)
Age 0.479*** 0.548*** 0.227*** 0.0961*** 0.111*** 0.0326***
(0.0221) (0.0278) (0.0340) (0.00680) (0.00864) (0.00830)
Other Prog. -0.0434 -0.0820 0.0685 -0.0813** -0.0987** -0.000810
(0.106) (0.134) (0.160) (0.0332) (0.0432) (0.0380)
Schl: Stud./Teach -0.0123 -0.0283 0.0122 0.00562 0.00863 -0.00207
(0.0168) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.00596) (0.00790) (0.00654)
Schl: % Board Cert. -0.884** -0.952* -0.711 0.243** 0.341** 0.298**
(0.392) (0.529) (0.512) (0.123) (0.169) (0.122)
Schl: % Adv. Deg. 0.237 0.165 0.672 0.258*** 0.304** 0.0386
(0.293) (0.378) (0.424) (0.0937) (0.122) (0.109)
Continued on next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
Schl: % Full Lic. -1.621*** -2.327*** 0.0921 -0.335** -0.326* -0.261
(0.410) (0.531) (0.589) (0.149) (0.192) (0.175)
Schl: % AYP Met -0.388*** -0.691*** 0.610*** -0.104** -0.106* -0.0156
(0.144) (0.187) (0.202) (0.0462) (0.0603) (0.0525)
Schl: Book/Stud. -0.000301 -0.000261 -0.000754 -0.00137** -0.00194** 0.000279
(0.000224) (0.000256) (0.000591) (0.000646) (0.000880) (0.000660)
Schl: % 1yr Turn. 0.272 -0.135 0.932*** 0.0565 0.0249 0.100
(0.243) (0.315) (0.344) (0.0797) (0.103) (0.0924)
Schl: % Teach. 1-3 Yr. 0.194 0.186 0.486 0.0442 0.113 -0.115
(0.238) (0.310) (0.340) (0.0783) (0.103) (0.0885)
County Unemp. 0.281*** 0.326*** 0.167*** 0.0813*** 0.0948*** 0.0544***
(0.0302) (0.0407) (0.0396) (0.00927) (0.0126) (0.00962)
Observations 375168 213312 147027 66285 285588 165376 117976 47400
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.381 0.371 0.385 0.011 0.375 0.383 0.305
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Figure 2.1: Counties Potentially Served by the Second Harvest Food Bank of North Western North
Carolina BackPack Program
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Table 2.A1: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Balanced Panel 2006
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.651∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ -0.00323 0.00160 0.00196
(0.0164) (0.00363) (0.00213) (0.00479) (0.0159) (0.00207) (0.00121) (0.00274)
FRL Eligible -0.192∗∗∗ -0.0377∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.00467 -0.0237∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00450) (0.00110) .00014 (0.00435) (0.000626) -.00036
FRL*BackPack 0.264∗∗∗ 0.00456 (.00524) 0.0113 0.00367∗ (.003)
(0.0178) (0.00352) (0.0173) (0.00201)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A2: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Balanced Panel 2006
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.0565 0.711∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.0138 -0.0737∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0239
(0.115) (0.136) (0.0852) (0.139) (0.0296) (0.0374) (0.0251) (0.0318)
FRL Eligible 1.855∗∗∗ 1.635∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0315) (0.0406) .3257** (0.00958) (0.0120) .0987**
FRL*BackPack -0.404∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ (.1627) -0.0359 -0.0900∗∗∗ (.0405)
(0.125) (0.132) (0.0323) (0.0347)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A3: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Unbalanced Panel
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.669∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.00279∗∗ 0.00241∗∗ 0.00318∗
(0.0106) (0.00244) (0.00184) (0.00302) (0.0103) (0.00140) (0.00105) (0.00174)
FRL Eligible -0.151∗∗∗ -0.0334∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0397∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00333) (0.000801) -.00332 (0.00323) (0.000459) -.00077
FRL*BackPack 0.159∗∗∗ -0.00608∗∗ (.00354) -0.0535∗∗∗ -0.000872 (.00204)
(0.0122) (0.00239) (0.0119) (0.00137)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A4: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Unbalanced Panel
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.324∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗ -0.0960∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.00992
(0.0722) (0.0893) (0.0731) (0.0883) (0.0189) (0.0256) (0.0225) (0.0215)
FRL Eligible 1.859∗∗∗ 1.548∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0226) (0.0290) .1208 (0.00690) (0.00884) .1037***
FRL*BackPack -0.267∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ (.1146) -0.0563∗∗∗ -0.0579∗∗ (.0311)
(0.0831) (0.0875) (0.0217) (0.0237)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A5: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Include FRL Switchers
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.621∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.000283 0.00185∗ 0.00124
(0.0117) (0.00259) (0.00179) (0.00321) (0.0117) (0.00149) (0.00102) (0.00185)
FRL Eligible -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0589∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00312) (0.000731) .00716* (0.00314) (0.000420) .0006
FRL*BackPack 0.228∗∗∗ 0.00530∗∗ (.00367) -0.0196 0.000710 (.00212)
(0.0131) (0.00255) (0.0132) (0.00147)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A6: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Include FRL Switchers
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.270∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ -0.0520 -0.0490∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0483∗
(0.0853) (0.0985) (0.0725) (0.102) (0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0220) (0.0255)
FRL Eligible 1.557∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0228) (0.0276) .3555*** (0.00701) (0.00843) .0907***
FRL*BackPack -0.235∗∗ -0.215∗∗ (.1251) -0.0316 -0.0427∗ (.0337)
(0.0958) (0.0972) (0.0250) (0.0259)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A7: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Exclude Other Programs
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.639∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ -0.000599 0.00233∗∗ 0.00104
(0.0136) (0.00300) (0.00203) (0.00377) (0.0134) (0.00173) (0.00116) (0.00218)
FRL Eligible -0.179∗∗∗ -0.0350∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0143∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00385) (0.000936) .00203 (0.00381) (0.000538) .00129
FRL*BackPack 0.240∗∗∗ 0.00324 (.00429) -0.00408 0.00167 (.00247)
(0.0151) (0.00293) (0.0149) (0.00168)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A8: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Exclude Other Programs
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.129 0.511∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.0169 -0.0578∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.0312
(0.0959) (0.112) (0.0815) (0.111) (0.0269) (0.0345) (0.0273) (0.0282)
FRL Eligible 1.849∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0272) (0.0344) .2999** (0.00901) (0.0114) .1486***
FRL*BackPack -0.407∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ (.1377) -0.143∗∗∗ -0.0833∗∗∗ (.0392)
(0.107) (0.109) (0.0299) (0.0318)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A9: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Lag All Dep. Vars
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.643∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ -0.000470 -0.00136 -0.00229
(0.0137) (0.00309) (0.00212) (0.00430) (0.0134) (0.00175) (0.00120) (0.00242)
FRL Eligible -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.00103) .00025 (0.00362) (0.000580) .00094
FRL*BackPack 0.227∗∗∗ 0.000947 (.00479) -0.0224 -0.00452∗∗∗ (.0027)
(0.0152) (0.00288) (0.0148) (0.00163)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A10: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Lag All Dep. Vars
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.118 0.402∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ -0.0454 -0.0365 0.155∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0153
(0.0955) (0.115) (0.0847) (0.125) (0.0251) (0.0316) (0.0239) (0.0264)
FRL Eligible 1.829∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0258) (0.0383) .3706** (0.00801) (0.0105) .1094***
FRL*BackPack -0.403∗∗∗ -0.169 (.1511) -0.0704∗∗ -0.0523∗ (.0356)
(0.106) (0.107) (0.0278) (0.0294)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A11: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, No Lagged Dep. Vars
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.643∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ -0.00724∗∗∗ -0.00436∗∗∗ -0.00504∗
(0.0137) (0.00386) (0.00233) (0.00479) (0.0134) (0.00219) (0.00135) (0.00261)
FRL Eligible -0.165∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0852∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.00111) .00438 (0.00362) (0.000632) .00068
FRL*BackPack 0.227∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ (.00533) -0.0224 0.00361 (.00294)
(0.0152) (0.00387) (0.0148) (0.00220)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A12: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, No Lagged Dep. Vars
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.118 0.877∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.0758 -0.0365 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0112 -0.0106
(0.0955) (0.106) (0.0698) (0.104) (0.0251) (0.0267) (0.0185) (0.0205)
FRL Eligible 1.829∗∗∗ 3.208∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0258) (0.0305) .3669*** (0.00801) (0.00845) .0217
FRL*BackPack -0.403∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗∗ (.1253) -0.0704∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ (.0276)
(0.106) (0.106) (0.0278) (0.0260)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A13: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, No School/County Vars
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.643∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ -0.00160 0.000270 0.00120
(0.0137) (0.00287) (0.00179) (0.00338) (0.0134) (0.00163) (0.00102) (0.00193)
FRL Eligible -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.000854) -.00136 (0.00362) (0.000486) -.00093
FRL*BackPack 0.227∗∗∗ 0.00248 (.00382) -0.0224 0.00129 (.00218)
(0.0152) (0.00289) (0.0148) (0.00164)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A14: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, No School/County Vars
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.118 0.628∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.155 -0.0365 0.184∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0218
(0.0955) (0.106) (0.0713) (0.0988) (0.0251) (0.0314) (0.0228) (0.0260)
FRL Eligible 1.829∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0258) (0.0312) .2884** (0.00801) (0.0101) .1401***
FRL*BackPack -0.403∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ (.1219) -0.0704∗∗ -0.0563∗ (.0346)
(0.106) (0.107) (0.0278) (0.0296)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 2.A15: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Based on Program Intensity
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
Intensity* 1.619∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0864∗∗∗ 2.304∗∗∗ 0.00493 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗
(0.0444) (0.0100) (0.00608) (0.0133) (0.0434) (0.00575) (0.00347) (0.00768)
FRL Eligible -0.144∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00371) (0.000884) .02798* (0.00362) (0.000508) -.01039
FRL*Intensity 0.357∗∗∗ 0.0155 (.01464) -0.370∗∗∗ 0.00709 (.00843)
(0.0482) (0.00968) (0.0471) (0.00556)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
*Intensity = #BP recipients/#FRL Eligible at the school.
Table 2.A16: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Based on Program Intensity
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
Intensity* -0.760∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗ 0.218 -0.239∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.111 0.0135
(0.306) (0.373) (0.244) (0.391) (0.0804) (0.108) (0.0765) (0.0994)
FRL Eligible 1.827∗∗∗ 1.589∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0256) (0.0325) .3843 (0.00791) (0.0100) .097
FRL*Intensity -0.812∗∗ -1.363∗∗∗ (.4603) -0.450∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ (.1254)
(0.333) (0.361) (0.0873) (0.0985)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 and 6-8 contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
*Intensity = #BP recipients/#FRL Eligible at the school.
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Table 2.A17: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Relax† Student/School/County Coefs.
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
Full DD Full DD† FRL Non FRL Full DD† Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ -0.000784 0.00218 0.00194∗ 0.00126
(0.00297) (0.00302) (0.00194) (0.00372) (0.00170) (0.00173) (0.00111) (0.00215)
FRL Eligible -0.0348∗∗∗ -0.0208 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0327∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.000889) (0.0210) .0017 (0.000511) (0.0120) .00069
FRL*BackPack 0.00328 0.00384 (.0042) 0.00170 -0.000899 (.00242)
(0.00290) (0.00299) (0.00166) (0.00171)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
All models contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A18: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Relax† Student/School/County
Coefs.
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
Full DD Full DD† FRL Non FRL Full DD† Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.550∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.0436 0.165∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0180
(0.110) (0.112) (0.0778) (0.109) (0.0317) (0.0324) (0.0240) (0.0265)
FRL Eligible 1.588∗∗∗ -0.959 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.261∗∗∗ -1.638∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0327) (0.781) .303** (0.0101) (0.296) .1095***
FRL*BackPack -0.345∗∗∗ -0.124 (.134) -0.0627∗∗ -0.0648∗∗ (.0357)
(0.108) (0.111) (0.0295) (0.0308)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
All models contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
† Allows student, school, and county coeﬃcients to diﬀer between FRL and Non FRL speciﬁcations (like split models)
using interaction terms, while forcing grade, year, and school ﬁxed eﬀects to be the same across the groups
(like the Full DD model).
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Table 2.A19: Math and Reading Scores: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Relax† Grade/Year/School Coefs.
Math Math Math Math Read Read Read Read
Full DD Full DD† FRL Non FRL Full DD† Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ -0.000784 -0.000784 0.00194∗ 0.00126
(0.00297) (0.00297) (0.00194) (0.00372) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00111) (0.00215)
FRL Eligible -0.0348∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.000889) (0.000889) .0017 (0.000511) (0.000511) .00069
FRL*BackPack 0.00328 0.00328 (.0042) 0.00170 0.00170 (.00242)
(0.00290) (0.00290) (0.00166) (0.00166)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
All models contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A20: Absences and Disciplinary Acts: Simple DD, Full DD, Split on FRL Eligibility, Relax† Grade/Year/School Coefs.
Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Dis Dis Dis Dis
Full DD Full DD† FRL Non FRL Full DD† Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack 0.550∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.0436 0.165∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0180
(0.110) (0.110) (0.0778) (0.109) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0240) (0.0265)
FRL Eligible 1.588∗∗∗ 1.588∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.0327) (0.0327) .303** (0.0101) (0.0101) .1095***
FRL*BackPack -0.345∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ (.134) -0.0627∗∗ -0.0627∗∗ (.0357)
(0.108) (0.108) (0.0295) (0.0295)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
All models contain student, school, and county characteristics; and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
† Allows grade, year, and school ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀer between FRL and Non FRL speciﬁcations (like split models)
using interaction terms, while forcing student, school, and county coeﬃcients to be the same across the groups
(like the Full DD model).
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Table 2.A21: Disciplinary Acts: Monday Only
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.00467 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.00109
(0.00594) (0.00848) (0.00642) (0.00750)
FRL Eligible 0.0730∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00190) (0.00271) .0197**
FRL*BackPack -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0146∗ (.0099)
(0.00658) (0.00790)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Models 2-4 contain student, school, and county characteristics;
and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A22: Disciplinary Acts: Wednesday Only
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.00291 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0113
(0.00701) (0.00971) (0.00733) (0.00869)
FRL Eligible 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.0551∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00223) (0.00310) .018
FRL*BackPack -0.0180∗∗ -0.0198∗∗ (.0114)
(0.00776) (0.00904)
Models 2-4 contain student, school, and county characteristics;
and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2.A23: Disciplinary Acts: Friday Only
DD Full DD FRL Non FRL
BackPack -0.00956 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ -0.00331
(0.00655) (0.00949) (0.00723) (0.00782)
FRL Eligible 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0529∗∗∗ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.00209) (0.00303) .028***
FRL*BackPack -0.0118 -0.0102 (.0107)
(0.00726) (0.00884)
Models 2-4 contain student, school, and county characteristics;
and grade, school, and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Weekend
Feeding Program Adoption
Charitable giving and volunteerism, on the surface, present somewhat of a puzzle to eco-
nomic theory based upon individuals acting exclusively in self-interest. If philanthropy is
purely a public good, both entirely non-rival and non-excludable, economic theory suggests
no utility-maximizing individual should contribute. However, many people do contribute
both time and money to charity. This has been a source of economic research for many years.
One explanation is altruism (Schwartz, 1970; Becker, 1974), suggesting the donor receives
positive utility from the well-being of others. A second theory is warm glow preferences.
That is, giving to charity makes the donor feel good about themselves independently of
the eﬀect the donation has on the recipient (Andreoni, 1989). Both theories are consistent
with the common ﬁnding that diversity leads to less giving (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005;
Hungerman, 2008; Vigdor, 2004; Luttmer et al., 2001; Kahn and Costa, 2003; Alesina et
al., 1999; Okten and Osili, 2004); or, rather, homogeneity is associated with greater giving.
Simply stated, donors are more likely to give to those like themselves.
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The current work extends this thinking to understand the factors aﬀecting the adoption
of private charitable programs. Speciﬁcally, I examine the Feeding America BackPack
program, which operates largely oﬀ donations of both time and money and provides food
on Fridays to children who have very little over the weekend. My results are consistent with
the current literature, ﬁnding that racial diversity is negatively associated with program
adoption. However, I also show that community income diversity is positively related to
the likelihood of adoption. This suggests the two ought to be considered separately. I also
ﬁnd that the prevalence of the program in a county as well as worsening unemployment are
signiﬁcant drivers of BackPack program adoption.
There is also a large body of literature evaluating the impacts of food insecurity and
caloric intake on health, education, human capital formation, and socioeconomic status.
Prior research focusing on the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and School Break-
fast Program (SBP) has found positive eﬀects of program participation on a wide range
of educational outcomes. However, prior research into the causal eﬀect of weekend feeding
programs such as the BackPack program through the national food bank, Feeding America,
has found substantial patterns of non-random program adoption (Kurtz, 2015) (Chapter
2).
Given the research on weekend feeding programs is relatively new, a better understand-
ing of what drives the adoption of such programs is essential. While weekend feeding
programs are similar to the NSLP and SBP in their overall intent, the programs are unique
in a number of ways important to this study. First, weekend feeding programs are privately
operated and funded programs. This means the opportunity cost of program adoption
at the school or community level is plausibly very diﬀerent from the government-funded
NSLP and SBP. Second, the sources and recipients of funding are also likely diﬀerent across
privately- and publicly-funded programs. Third, there are currently no mandates that a
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school implement a weekend feeding program as there are for the NSLP and SBP. Fourth,
those responsible for implementing the programs are largely volunteers. In this study, I
examine the characteristics of schools and surrounding communities that adopt or do not
adopt a BackPack program as well as the timing of their program initiation in Northwest
North Carolina.
In order to evaluate the BackPack program adoption process, I combine program en-
rollment data from the weekend feeding programs with community data from the American
Community Survey (ACS) and US Census at the census tract level and with school char-
acteristic data from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. I ﬁnd modest
evidence that community diversity as measured by the racial proﬁle of the surrounding
census tract follows the current ﬁndings in the literature, and is associated with a lower
probability of program adoption. Diversity between the community and the school (here
considered the donors and recipients, respectively) does not seem to have an eﬀect. How-
ever, community diversity as measured by the community income inequality is associated
with a greater probability of adoption. I also ﬁnd that the prevalence of the program in
a county and worsening economic conditions are associated with increased program adop-
tion. The following sections describe this analysis as well as the policy implications of such
ﬁndings.
3.1 Past Research
Given that charitable giving and volunteerism present somewhat of a puzzle to basic eco-
nomic theory, a substantial literature examining the source and determinants of philan-
thropy has arisen, gaining wide popularity in the 1970s. Despite the public-good-nature of
philanthropy, many people often choose to contribute time and money to charitable causes.
Three explanations for this phenomenon prevail and may exist simultaneously. First, giving
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may be motivated by altruism (Schwartz, 1970; Becker, 1974). That is, if a donor receives
positive utility from the well-being of others, then the donor may be motivated to par-
ticipate in charitable actions. It has been noted, however, that this explanation does not
account for the wide-spread prevalence of philanthropy as the well-being of others is also a
public good and should therefore suﬀer from the free-rider problem. That is, I would receive
the same additional utility whether I or someone else is responsible for the improvement in
another's well-being. A second theory suggests charitable giving is (at least in part) moti-
vated by the material gains received from giving (Posnett and Sandler, 1986; Sugden, 1984;
Cornes and Sandler, 1994), such as the possibility that giving will make charitable services
available to the donor later in life. However, there are many instances of giving in the
absence of a clear external beneﬁt to the donor (giving to disaster relief in another country,
for instance). In light of this observation, the importance of warm-glow preferences has
been suggested. This theory suggests individuals may receive additional utility speciﬁcally
from the act of giving (Andreoni, 1989).
Pure altruism and pure warm-glow preferences sit on opposite ends of the spectrum.
The former suggests personal donations and donations from another source yield equal util-
ity. The latter suggests personal donations are the only form of donation that yields any
personal utility. If the former prevails, public support of private charities (through grants
or otherwise) should lead to an equal decrease (crowd-out) of private donations. The latter
suggests public support should have very little eﬀect on private donations. The literature on
public crowd-out of private donations has delivered widely varying ﬁndings. Kingma (1989),
using data on donations to public radio stations, ﬁnds evidence of moderate government
crowd-out of private donations. Okten and Weisbrod (2000), using IRS data on US non-
proﬁt organizations such as hospitals and schools, ﬁnds government grants have very little
negative eﬀect on private donations; and, in some cases, can have a stimulating eﬀect. Using
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data on individual donations to international relief and development organizations, Ribar
and Wilhelm (2002) again ﬁnd very little evidence of government crowd out. Andreoni and
Payne (2003) suggests, that while individual donations may not be crowded out by govern-
ment support, the charitable organization itself has reduced incentive to commit resources
toward fund-raising that may not be measured by previous studies. Andreoni and Payne
(2011) ﬁnds the overall eﬀect of government crowd-out can be 30% attributed to individual
crowd-out and 70% to decreased fund-raising eﬀorts on the part of the organization.
In addition to a substantial body of work regarding crowd-out, past research has also
focused on the price and income elasticities of charitable giving (focusing predominantly on
the giving of funds rather than time). Early in the empirical literature on charitable giving,
there was relative stability in the estimates of price and income elasticities, ﬁnding price
elasticities between -1.1 and -1.5 and income elasticities between 0.7 and 0.87 (Feldstein and
Clotfelter, 1976; Feldstein and Taylor, 1976; Clotfelter, 1985). However, lack of exogenous
variation (particularly on the price side) made reliable identiﬁcation diﬃcult. Randolph
(1995) used plausibly exogenous variation in tax reform1 to examine the eﬀects of both
permanent and transitory changes to price and income. Charitable giving is shown to be
more income elastic for permanent income compared to transitory income (with elasticities
of 1.14 and 0.58 respectively). However, it was also shown that charitable giving is more
price elastic for transitory price changes than permanent price changes (with elasticities
of -1.55 and -0.51 respectively). Using largely the same data but a diﬀerent identiﬁcation
strategy, Auten et al. (2002) ﬁnds charitable giving is more responsive to permanent changes
in both price and income compared to transitory changes (income elasticities of 0.87 and
0.29 for permanent and transitory changes; price elasticities of -1.26 and -0.40 for permanent
and transitory changes). The Auten et al. (2002) estimates of permanent income and price
1The price of a $1 donation, p, is $(1-τ), where τ is the donor's marginal tax rate.
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elasticities are more in line with the earlier estimates, but there is far from a consensus on
the responsiveness of charitable donations to changes in either income or price.
The majority of studies on charitable giving have focused on monetary donations. How-
ever, a substantial body of research exists investigating the determinants of time donations
(volunteerism). Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) ﬁnds as wages increase, volunteerism de-
creases, with an elasticity of -.4 for average wages, and ﬁnds time and money contributions
are strong complements. Brown and Lankford (1992) also ﬁnds time and money contribu-
tions to be complements, suggesting studies examining the eﬀects of policies on monetary
donations understate the total eﬀect on philanthropy. Other studies, however, ﬁnd time and
money donations are substitutes (Freeman, 1997; Duncan, 1999), which suggests estimates
may be overstating the total eﬀect of a policy on total philanthropy.
While price and income have a substantial eﬀect on donations of both money and time,
there is evidence many other factors aﬀect an individual's decision to give. In particular,
a growing literature has examined the eﬀect of diversity on charitable activity. This is the
literature most closely related to my work. There is evidence that both diversity within
the donor community as well as diversity between the donors and recipients is negatively
associated with charitable activity. Although, the two are often not explicitly separated.
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show schools in more ethnically diverse areas of Kenya
receive lower funding. Vigdor (2004) ﬁnds counties that are more racially, generationally,
and educationally diverse exhibit lower response rates to the Census questionnaire (which
is used to inform the distribution of federal grants). This ﬁnding suggests more diverse
communities favor redistribution less because as a community becomes more diverse the
beneﬁts of grant money increasingly accrue to groups dissimilar to the respondent. Luttmer
et al. (2001) similarly ﬁnds individuals favor welfare programs less as the relative prevalence
of their own racial group declines. Additionally, Kahn and Costa (2003), in a study of
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the American Civil War, ﬁnds soldiers in more heterogeneous companies (as measured by
ethnicity, occupation and age) were more likely to shirk their responsibilities (as measured
by desertion, arrests, and absences without leave). Alesina et al. (1999) shows localities
exhibiting higher racial heterogeneity demonstrate less support for public goods (such as
education and roads). Okten and Osili (2004), using data from the Indonesia Family Life
Survey (1997-1998) conducted by RAND, shows ethnic heterogeneity negatively aﬀects the
amount citizens contribute both time and money to community organizations.
Hungerman (2008) is one of the few to explicitly examine both the characteristics of the
donors and recipients, but chooses to focus mainly on the diversity between the donors and
recipients (rather than the diversity within the donor community). Predominantly White
churches become less philanthropic as the overall community becomes more racially diverse
(measured by the proportion of the community who are Black). The same ﬁnding is not
established for churches that have a more racially diverse congregation (Hungerman, 2008).
In this study, I ﬁnd evidence that adoption of charitable programs (which require do-
nations of both time and money) is aﬀected by the racial diversity of the donors as is
commonly found regarding the donation of time and money separately, (but ﬁnd little ev-
idence that diﬀerence between the donors and recipients matters). However, I also show
donor income diversity has the opposite eﬀect on program adoption. Going beyond the
discussion of diversity, I address gaps in the literature regarding other determinants of pri-
vate charitable program adoption. Speciﬁcally I examine how adoption is inﬂuenced by the
prevalence of the program in surrounding communities and by changing economic condi-
tions. Understanding these factors is the ﬁrst step in understanding how they interact with
the public crowd-out of private eﬀorts and thus will help in determining where government
intervention is most useful or most harmful.
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3.2 Conceptual Framework
To make clear the goals and contributions of this work, I present the following conceptual
framework. One ﬁnding from the prior literature that is addressed in the current study is
that diversity is related to diminished charitable activity. In order to address this issue as
clearly and completely as possible, I ﬁrst deﬁne what I mean by diversity.
3.2.1 Deﬁning Diversity
When studying charitable giving, diversity has been discussed in many forms. I ﬁnd it
useful here to be deliberate in how I deﬁne and discuss diversity. First, I will consider two
groups when considering charitable giving: the donors and the recipients. Diversity can
manifest itself within either group but also between the two. Because I do not observe the
speciﬁc donors directly, I deﬁne the donors as the community surrounding a school and
the recipients as the students in those schools. One aspect of this research that is distinct
from much of the prior literature on charitable giving is that I observe and actively utilize
characteristics of both groups.
Diversity ﬁrst can manifest itself in the donor community. The residents of the com-
munity can be diﬀerent from each other based on many characteristics, such as race, age,
education, and income. I call this community diversity. Second, diversity can be con-
sidered between the donor communities and the recipients (students/schools). I call this
community-school diversity. Examples of community-school diversity could be a school
attended predominantly by White students in a predominantly Black community, a rela-
tively poor school in an auent neighborhood, or an elementary school in a community
without many kids. Because the majority of the burden of facilitating a program falls on
the community, I treat the schools as passive in the adoption decision process,2 and do not
2The school can have some say in the initiation of a program mostly by taking it upon themselves
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explore within-school diversity explicitly.
Community-school diversity might matter if giving is motivated by a feeling of empathy
(Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). One might expect donors to have an easier time empathiz-
ing and identifying with recipients that are similar to themselves. Giving could also be
motivated by one's values, in which case donors will be more inclined to give to those who
share their values or other characteristics (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). Community diver-
sity (proxying for diversity within the donor community) may matter if charitable activity
is motivated in part by expectations and reputation (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). If a
community is largely homogeneous, then there may be pressure to support common causes
and the harm to reputation for not participating may be greater. There is also evidence
that the awareness and perception of need is linked to charitable activity (Olsen and Eidem,
2003). If communities are more homogeneous and cohesive, the need for a program may be
better known.
3.2.2 Research Questions
If charitable giving is a normal good, all else equal, wealthier communities should be more
likely to adopt a program. However, if communities adopt a program because the need is
particularly high, poorer communities will adopt more often. The literature on charitable
giving, however, suggests a more complex relationship.3
The literature suggests both within-donor diversity and diversity between donor and
recipient diminishes charitable giving. We might then expect homogeneous communities
(by race, education, age, unemployment status, etc.) or to adopt programs at higher rates.
We would also expect communities that are similar to the schools they might serve (by
to reach out to Feeding America or the community to alert them of the need and desire to participate.
However, it is the community that is primarily responsible for initiating and sustaining a program.
3Among other factors, there is evidence income does inﬂuence how much to give, but does not inﬂuence
the decision to give or not (Smith et al., 1995).
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race, proportion in poverty, etc.) would be more likely to adopt.
Income and income diversity present a more nuanced set of possibilities. Community
income diversity may aﬀect giving similarly to race in that more income diverse communities
may be less cohesive and thus less apt to be charitably active. However, income also aﬀects
the need for- and ability to provide a program. Given BackPack programs are community
funded, some base level of income is necessary to sustain the program. However, there must
also be enough interest in having a program, which is likely an inverse function of income.4
It seems plausible, then, that communities adopting a program exhibit both qualities: a
large population of both relatively poor students, to justify the need for a program, and
a large population of relatively wealthy community members, to facilitate the program.
If community-school similarity matters in program adoption then, we would also expect a
portion of the community residents to be relatively poor, mirroring the need of the students.
An increase in community income and income diversity could then be associated with less
giving because it may increase both the community diversity and the community-school
diversity. It might, however, increase giving because the community is more able to give,
and the students may be more needy. The latter suggests that greater income diversity
may actually be positively associated with program adoption.
Further, communities may work to adopt, fund, and sustain a program in response
to worsening economic conditions. A community may have a strong incentive to attempt
to insulate the children from ﬂuctuations in the business cycle and economic hardship
(Randolph, 1995). It could also be the case that the expectations a community has for itself
play a role. If a community is used to a high standard of living and low unemployment,
even small ﬂuctuations may incentivize program adoption.
4Indeed, free/reduced lunch eligibility (one of the criteria used to determine which schools are eligible
for BackPack programs) is based largely on household income.
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The timing of private charitable program adoption has not received much attention.5
However, given that there are substantial diﬀerences between early adopting and late adopt-
ing schools (particularly in the percent white and percent eligible for free/reduced lunch,
discussed later), the drivers of the timing of adoption are of some interest.
Following the economic theory and observations discussed here, I present the resulting
testable research questions:
1. Do community income diversity and racial/ethnic diversity aﬀect program adoption
in a similar way?
2. How does community-school diversity aﬀect program adoption?
3. Do communities adopt programs in response to worsening local economic conditions?
4. What factors aﬀect the timing of program adoption?
3.3 Data
The data for this study come from several sources. Unique data describing the adoption
of a BackPack program by a school are collected from the Second Harvest Food Bank of
Northwest North Carolina (Kurtz, 2015) (Chapter 2). School characteristics are derived
from the Public School Universe and School Report Card ﬁles maintained by the North
Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) at Duke University. These school-
level data are matched to community data according to the census tract in which they reside.
The Census Geocoder tool maintained by the United States Census Bureau provides the
ability to match street addresses to the associated census tract. This allows school data
5Timing of adoption has been studied in other ﬁelds such as hospital innovation (Lee and Waldman,
1985), and the variation of intensity and timing of the spread of public child health and family planning
interventions (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986).
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to be linked to the characteristics of the immediately surrounding community. The 2000
Census provides census-tract-level economic and social characteristics of these communities
and provides a good baseline description of the communities prior to the decision to adopt a
BackPack program. The 2013 ACS provides 5-year averages (2009-2013) regarding largely
the same information as the Census and allows the most current description of how the
communities have changed in the intervening time.
3.3.1 BackPack Program Background and Data
Weekend feeding programs can take on many diﬀerent forms, but all with the common goal
of providing food for the weekend to students who may have limited or no access otherwise.
The ﬁrst program, called the Backpacks for Kids program, began in 1995 in Little Rock
Arkansas. Since then, their basic model of providing ready-to-eat food to students on
Fridays after school has been adopted in many locations by many diﬀerent organizations.
In particular, in 2006, Feeding America (a nation-wide food bank) started their BackPack
program. The program has grown to partner with over 150 local food banks and currently
serves 230,000 children per year (FeedingAmerica.org). This study is focused on one of these
partnerships with the Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwest North Carolina (SHFB),
which served 82 schools in 2014.
There are many ways in which a school can be identiﬁed to start a program. The most
common path is for a person or group (either from the community or the school itself) to
reach out to the SHFB with the desire to organize a program. It is also possible, although
less common, for the food bank itself to contact a school directly. Feeding America requires
schools have at least 50% of the student body enrolled in the free/reduced lunch program
and at least 50 students interested in participating for a program to begin in a school.6
6Students are most often selected to participate in the program when a teacher or nurse recommends
the student be enrolled in the program. At that time, a letter goes home to the parent or guardian for
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The food for each student comes from a Feeding America center in Nashville, Tennessee
and is transported to SHFB as well as other food banks operating a BackPack program in
other areas. Each pack contains two servings of grains (usually cereal), three servings of fruit
(usually, 100% juice boxes and fruit cups), two servings of protein, two servings of milk, and
one serving of vegetables. Each school with a BackPack program partners with a local non-
proﬁt community partner organization that is then responsible for storing, packing, and
delivering the food each week. This partner is often an established community organization
such as a church but many times the organization is formed speciﬁcally to facilitate the
BackPack program in that school. All community partners are staﬀed by volunteers and
there is relatively little work required of the school administration and employees.
Table 3.1 shows the BackPack programs in northwestern North Carolina expanded con-
sistently from year to year starting with 9 backpack schools (4.2% of all potentially eligible
schools) in 2009 to 72 schools served in 2013 (25.8% of all potentially eligible schools).
Potentially eligible is comprised of all schools with greater than 50% of the student body
eligible for free/reduced lunch. The four main counties are shaded in grey, and comprise 53
of the 72 BackPack schools in 2013 (Table 3.1). Davidson, Forsyth and Guilford Counties
share borders with each other; Yadkin County borders Forsyth County. Figure 3.1 shows
the counties in North Carolina that are served by the BackPack program run by SHFB
between 2009 and 2013.
Starting in 2011, there were other weekend feeding programs in these counties as well.
They exist with the same goal of providing food to students over the weekends but are
not associated with Feeding America and do not have the adoption criteria the BackPack
program has. Suﬃcient data do not exist to incorporate these programs into the study. I
know which schools had adopted one of these other programs by 2014, but I do not observe
consent and allergy information. It is less common also possible for a parent or guardian to approach the
BackPack program directly.
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when they adopt. Because the adoption criteria are so diﬀerent, it is most appropriate to
treat the schools with one of these other programs as having no program in the analyses. I
examine the robustness of this methodology later in the paper.
3.3.2 NCERDC Data
This study uses two data sets maintained by the NCERDC, the Public School Universe ﬁles
(2006-2012) and the School Report Card ﬁles from (2006-2013). The Public School Uni-
verse ﬁles contain information on the schools' student/teacher ratio, percentage of students
eligible for free/reduced lunch, and the student racial proﬁle. The School Report Card ﬁles
contain information on the proportion of students in poverty as well as many measures of
school quality. Also contained in these ﬁles are the physical addresses of the schools, which
are used in conjunction with the Census Geocoder to identify the census tract (community)
surrounding each school.
3.3.3 Census Geocoder
The Census Geocoder provides the ability to match addresses to geographic locations and
entities containing those addresses. (www.Census.gov) This allows me to identify in which
census tract each school resides, so school and BackPack data can be matched with tract
characteristics from the 2000 Census and 2013 American Community Survey (ACS). A
census tract typically has a population between 1,200 and 8,000 people with an optimum
size of 4,000 people. (www.Census.gov) Census tracts are contiguous areas, do not cross
state or county boundaries, and are intended to be stable over time. Tract boundaries are
considered for redistricting every 10 years (most recently in 2000 and 2010) but only a
proportion exhibit a substantial change. Physical school addresses were entered into the
Geocoder batch upload tool, which was able to match 86.4% of the schools to a census
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tract. For the schools that were not matched, the mailing address was used (provided the
mailing address was in the same town as the physical address). This brought the schools
matched to tracts up to 90% (52 missing out of 522 total schools) with an equal percentage
split between BackPack and non-participating schools.
3.3.4 2000 Census and 2013 ACS
The 2000 Decennial Census of Population and Housing Summary File 3 provides economic
data aggregated to the census tract level. From this, I obtain measures of the percent white,
percent of the population who are children, the percent unemployed, percent who are high
school graduates, the median household income, and a bucketed income measure used to
derive the income Gini coeﬃcient (described below). I obtain the same characteristics
from the 2013 ACS 5-year estimate summarized data ﬁle. This ﬁle contains census tract
data averaged over the preceding 5 years (2009-2013). These data provide a depiction
of the economic climate each community was experiencing around the time of BackPack
program adoption. Examining how the communities change from 2000 to 2013 helps reveal
the economic situations in which they found themselves and how that situation changed
from a period before the adoption decision (2000 Census) to during the adoption decision
(2009-2013 ACS).
Matching tracts from 2013 to 2000 is done with the census tract relationship ﬁle provided
by the US Census Bureau. This describes how tracts have changed (or not changed) over
the years. The school addresses are used to identify the surrounding tract as of the 2010
Census. Most tracts are stable over time and pose no diﬃculty in matching across years.
However, some tracts are split into two tracts or are merged into a single tract. This creates
some diﬃculty in comparing tracts across years because it is not clear if a change in the tract
characteristics is due to a real change or if is a function of the tract boundaries changing and
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representing a diﬀerent population. To account for this, I weight the tract characteristics in
2000 by the proportion of the population they are associated with in 2010, and vice versa.
Doing this makes the 2000 and 2010 tract characteristics more directly comparable. This
only aﬀects the tracts that change substantially from 2000 to 2010, which comprise about
25% of all tracts (See the census tract weighting description in Appendix 3.B).
3.3.5 Gini Coeﬃcient
The Gini coeﬃcient is a measure of inequality. For this study, I consider the income Gini
coeﬃcient to measure the income inequality in each tract. The Gini coeﬃcient varies from
0 to 1 where a value of 0 indicates a perfectly equal income distribution (everyone has the
exact same income) and a value of 1 indicates the most unequal distribution of incomes
(one person earns all the income and everyone else earns nothing). Geometrically, the
Gini coeﬃcient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz cure and the line of equality
(45-degree line) and the area under the equality line. It is equivalently equal to twice the
area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality (Figure 3.2). The Lorenz function,
Ł, plots the proportion of total income held (cumulatively) by the bottom x proportion
of the population. For instance, Ł(.5) = 0.25 means the bottom 50% of the population
collectively earn 25% of the total income. This means the Lorenz function always passes
through points (0,0) and (1,1) and is bounded above by the 45-degree line. Figure 3.2 shows
a general formation of the Lorenz function and Gini coeﬃcient. If everyone earns the same
income then the Lorenz curve is coincident with the 45-degree line and the Gini coeﬃcient
is zero. If a single person earns all of the income, the Lorenz curve is equal to zero until x
= 1, at which point the Lorenz curve jumps to 1. In this case the Gini coeﬃcient is equal
to 1.
In the absence of knowledge of each individual's income to construct the true Lorenz
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curve, I approximate the Lorenz curve with a bucketed income measure (e.g. 10% earn
less than $15,000, 15% earn between $15,000 and $25,000, and so on). To do this I make a
minimally restrictive assumption about income distribution within each bucket by assigning
everyone within a bucket the average within-bucket-income.7 This produces a pseudo-
Lorenz curve (Figure 3.3). From here the area between the pseudo-Lorenz curve and the 45-
degree line can be calculated geometrically as the sum of trapezoidal areas. This calculation
is performed for each tract and serves as the measure of income inequality.
3.3.6 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides the breakdown of the number of schools with and without BackPack
programs in the 17 counties examined in this study8 based on their potential eligibility for
a BackPack program. To be eligible for a program a school must have 50% of their student
body participating in the free/reduced lunch program and have 50 students identiﬁed to
start the program. I have no way of assessing the interest of the students (greater than
or less than 50 students interested in such a program) in a school unless they start a
program.9 I can, however, observe which schools have 50% of their student body eligible
for free/reduced lunch.10
Table 3.2 shows 57% of all schools in the 17 counties are potentially eligible for a
BackPack program. Table 3.2 also provides summary statistics for all covariates used in
7Equivalently, I could assume a uniform within-bucket income distribution.
8Alamance, Alexander, Alleghany, Ashe, Caldwell, Davidson, Davie, Forsyth, Guilford, Iredell, Ran-
dolph, Rockingham, Stokes, Surry, Watauga, Wilkes, and Yadkin Counties.
9Although I cannot observe the interest in non-adopting schools, I can observe a weak proxy by examining
the number of free/reduced lunch eligible students at a school. Given that the student recipients are likely
a subset of the free/reduced lunch population, I could add the additional restriction that a school must
have at least 50 free/reduced lunch eligible students. Of the 502 schools with > 50% free/reduced lunch
eligible students only 33 have fewer than 50. Because this is a weak proxy and not binding for the majority
of schools, I do not use it as a restriction going forward.
10Eligibility is a less strict criterion than participation but free/reduce lunch participation is not ob-
served in the data.
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this analysis and their descriptions based on the potentially eligible schools. Columns 3
and 4 provide the mean and standard deviation for all schools with greater than 50% of
the student body eligible for free/reduced lunch. Columns 5-8 provide summary statistics
for diﬀerent sub-samples. Columns 5 and 6 describe the schools that never adopt vs. ever
adopt respectively. Columns 7 and 8 describe (conditional upon ever adopting) the schools
that adopt early (in years 2009 or 2010) vs. adopt late (in years 2011-2013). Diﬀerences
that are statistically signiﬁcant are designated by statistics in bold.
The middle rows compare the tracts in which the schools reside. Between the ever
adopting schools and schools that never adopt, the surrounding tracts appear similar. The
only statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are exhibited in the percent in poverty (15% com-
pared to 13%) and in the percent unemployed in 2000 (6% compared to 5%). Relating to
Research Question 1, there is no evidence in the unconditional means to suggest community
racial or income diversity (as measured by the tract percent White and Gini coeﬃcients)
aﬀects program adoption.
However, the schools themselves do exhibit a number of diﬀerences. BackPack schools
have both a higher percentage and higher number of free/reduced lunch eligible students
compared to schools that never adopt (72% compared to 62% and 343.38 students compared
to 301.29). BackPack schools also exhibit higher rates of poverty and a lower percentage of
White students (80% poverty compared to 66% poverty and 36% White compared to 49%
White). Contrary to the observation that the BackPack schools appear poorer, they are also
marginally better staﬀed with no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the student/teacher
ratio but a larger percentage of the teachers fully licensed (97% compared to 94%).
I also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between ever and never adopting areas
when looking at community-school diversity (Research Question 2). The BackPack schools
diﬀer more from the surrounding tract based both on the absolute diﬀerence in the percent
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white and percent in poverty (31pp and 65pp compared to 25pp and 55pp). However,
the tracts surrounding both types of schools seem to have changed similarly from 2000 to
2013 suggesting communities may not adopt programs in response to worsening economic
conditions (Research Question 3).
When examining the timing of adoption (Research Question 4), I also observe some
diﬀerences between the schools that adopt early (2009 or 2010) compared to those that
adopt later (2011-2013). The late adopting schools have a higher percentage of the stu-
dent population eligible for free/reduced lunch (74% compared to 61%) but have fewer
free/reduced lunch eligible students over all (242 compared to 367). Late adopting schools
are far less White (31% compared to 60%) and better staﬀed with a lower student/teacher
ratio (12.42 compared to 13.64). The only statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the tracts
surrounding the early and late adopting schools is in the percent white, with late adopting
schools residing in less white tracts (62% compared to 80%). The diﬀerences in the percent
White persists when examining the diﬀerences between the school and the tract with late
adopting schools appearing more racially diﬀerent from the tract (33pp compared to 20pp
diﬀerence). Once again the diﬀerences in how the tracts changed over time do not appear
statistically signiﬁcant.
It is important to keep in mind that these summary statistics do not take other charac-
teristics into account (they are unconditional means), so the inference regarding the research
questions is only suggestive, but provides a guide to the full analyses. Overall, the tracts in
which the schools reside generally appear similar. However, the characteristics of the school
diﬀer dramatically in some cases when comparing those schools to ever adopt to those that
never adopt as well as the early adopting schools to the late adopting schools.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
I examine two dimensions of the program adoption decision. First, I examine which factors
aﬀect the probability of ever adopting a BackPack program. Second, I explore the factors
aﬀecting the timing of the adoption decision. I then jointly estimate the adoption and
timing decisions.
3.4.1 Ever Adopt Analysis
The primary econometric model is a binomial probit estimating the likelihood of a particular
school ever adopting a BackPack program over the entire time period of the data (2009-
2013). This model will provide a look into Research Questions 1 and 2 by examining how
income, income diversity, and racial diversity (among other factors) aﬀect the probability
of adoption. The base-line econometric speciﬁcation takes the form:
Ys = β1SchoolCharacteristicss + β2CommunnityCharacteristicsc + s (3.1)
Here, Ys is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the school, s, ever adopts a BackPack
program and equal to 0 otherwise. School Characteristics is a vector of covariates describing
the school, s, including the student/teacher ratio (as a measure of availability of resources),
the percentage of teachers fully licensed (as a measure of the quality of resources), the
percent white, total number of students eligible for free/reduced lunch, and school poverty
rate. Although school data vary by year, the dependent variable does not. I use the 2009
values for schools characteristics to capture the school conditions in the ﬁrst year of the
program. Community Characteristics is a vector describing the community, c, in which
the school resides (deﬁned by the census tract) and contains factors such as the community
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percent white, percent children, unemployment rate, the median income, percent high school
grads, and the income Gini coeﬃcient. These measures are taken from the 2000 census to
capture a snapshot of the communities prior to their decisions to adopt or not adopt a
BackPack program. To understand Research Question 2 further by examining community-
school diversity, a second speciﬁcation is estimated including the absolute diﬀerence between
the school and surrounding census tract poverty rates, and percent white.
Ys =β1SchoolCharacteristicss + β2CommunityCharacteristicsc
+ β3|Schools − Communityc|+ s (3.2)
To examine Research Question 3 (how adoption is related to changing economic factors),
I incorporate census tract data from the 2013 ACS to see how the tracts changed since
2000. I replace the absolute |school − community| diﬀerences (measuring the community-
school diversity) with [community2013− community2000] diﬀerences (measuring how the
community has changed over time).
Ys =β1SchoolCharacteristicss + β2CommunityCharacteristicsc
+ β3[Community2013 − Community2000] + s (3.3)
The last model is a combination of Models 2 and 3 and incorporates school characteris-
tics, community characteristics as well as the absolute diﬀerences between the two and the
changes in the communities over time:
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Ys =β1SchoolCharacteristicss + β2CommunityCharacteristicsc
+ β3|Schools − Communityc|
+ β4[Community2013 − Community2000] + s (3.4)
3.4.2 Timing of Adoption
The above speciﬁcations help explain the factors aﬀecting the decision of a school and
community to adopt a program (Research Questions 1-3). I continue by examining Research
Question 4 to understand what drives the timing of adoption. I limit the sample to schools
to ever adopt and deﬁne a new dependent variable (Order Adopt), which takes values
between 1 and 5. Order Adopt = 5 if the school adopts a BackPack program in the
earliest year (2009) and = 1 if the school adopts in the latest year (2013). This means a
positive parameter estimate indicates a covariate associated with earlier adoption and vice
versa. Table 3.2 shows the demographics of schools to adopt a BackPack program diﬀer
measurably for those that adopt early (2009 or 2010) compared to adopt late (2011 or 2013).
The following speciﬁcations are designed to help uncover which school and community
characteristics are associated with the timing of adoption while controlling for all other
factors. Table 3.2 indicates it was the wealthier schools to adopt ﬁrst, suggesting the
availability of resources may have been an important factor. With this in mind I re-estimate
Models 1-4 conditional on ever adopting a BackPack program with the Ordered Adopt
dependent variable using an ordered probit.
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3.4.3 Discrete Time Survival Analysis
A third approach is to employ a discrete-time survival analysis. This approach makes
use of the panel nature of the data and estimates the probability of program adoption in
each year (as opposed to the probability of ever adopting). Doing so means that a factor
associated with a higher probability of program adoption in year, t, is also associated with
a higher probability of adopting earlier on average. As such, the discrete time survival
analysis jointly estimates both the likelihood and timing of adoption. Such analyses have
been used frequently in economics (e.g. Jenkins, 1995; Beaudin and Huang, 2014) and other
ﬁelds to examine the probability of an event occurring over a discrete set of time intervals.
This allows the joint inspection of Research Questions 1-4, the use of time-varying school
characteristics, and the ability to control for the prevalence of the program as it expands.
To do this, I limit the sample to 2009 and after (because it was not possible to adopt prior
to 2009), and re-estimate Models 1-4 deﬁning a new dependent variable, Adoptst. Adoptst
is a dichotomous variable = 0 for all years prior to adoption of the program, = 1 in the
year the community adopts the program, and then the school drops out of the data set. For
example, a community that adopts in 2012 will have four observations; Adoptst = 0 during
2009-2011 and = 1 in 2012. Survival analysis is appropriate because, for the communities
examined, no community adopts and then subsequently drops the program. Thus, only the
decision to adopt is modeled. The resulting estimates provide the relationship between the
covariate and the event hazard. Simply put, a positive parameter estimate (or equivalently
a hazard ratio of greater than 1) indicates a positive association with program adoption in
any given year, t, and thus negative association with time to adoption.
Because the discrete time duration analysis is a panel analysis (the outcome varying
by school and year), I modify models 1-4 to incorporate time-varying school characteristics
and year ﬁxed eﬀects. It was also noted earlier that many of the adopting communities
116
are in the same four counties suggesting there may be some positive eﬀect on program
adoption for being located near another school to adopt. To account for this, I include
an additional regressor, CountyAdoptc,t−1, that varies by county, c, and year and is the
cumulative number of schools in a county to have adopted a program by the previous year.11
3.5 Results
The results presented here are broken into three main sections. Section 3.5.1 pertains to
understanding what factors are associated with the adoption or non-adoption of a Back-
Pack program. Section 3.5.2 pertains to the factors associated with the timing of adoption
conditional on ever adoption a BackPack program. Section 3.5.3 combines these two anal-
yses in a discrete time survival analysis that jointly estimates the probability and timing of
program adoption.12
3.5.1 Factors Aﬀecting Adoption
Table 3.3 contains the four model speciﬁcations. Column 1 estimates Model 1 and pro-
vides a baseline containing only school and community characteristics. Model 2 includes
the absolute diﬀerences between the school and community to capture community-school
diversity (Research Question 2). Model 3 includes the changes in the community over time
(Research Question 3). Model 4 is the least restrictive model and includes all variables
(levels, diﬀerences, and changes). Research Question 1 is addressed in all four models (ex-
amining the racial proﬁle and income characteristics of the community). When reading the
table, the preﬁx, School, denotes a school characteristic, Census denotes a community
11For ease of comparison to the ever adopt and order adopt models, I also estimate the discrete time
survival model without the lagged cumulative BackPack school count. These results are reported in the
Appendix Table 3.A5 and discussed further in the robustness discussion.
12Because multicollinearity is a concern in all models, I provide a table of correlations in Appendix Table
3.A1.
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characteristic from the US Census taken in 2000, Diﬀ |s-c| denotes an absolute diﬀerence
between the school and the community as measured by the 2000 Census, and Diﬀ [a-c]
denotes a change in the community between 2013 as measured by the 2013 ACS and 2000
as measured by the 2000 Census.
With regard to Research Question 1, I show very little evidence that the racial diver-
sity of the community aﬀects program adoption (as measured by the community percent
White13). However, Model 1 does indicate an association of community income diversity
with program adoption. The tract income Gini coeﬃcient is positively related to program
adoption in Model 1 and, although insigniﬁcant in the remaining models, the parameter
estimate is relatively stable across speciﬁcations. This suggests as the tract exhibits greater
income inequality, the school in that tract is more likely to adopt a program (consistent
with the prior discussion). This result exists even when controlling for the median house-
hold income. In this case, the common ﬁnding that diversity is associated with less giving
does not extend to income diversity.
I also explore the use of tract %poverty as a measure of income inequality that is
more directly comparable to measure of racial inequality (%White) and %poverty at the
school. This shows no relationship with program adoption. Although it is a more direct
comparison to %White, there are reasons to believe %poverty is not a good measure of
income inequality. In particular, %White can approximate racial inequality reasonably well
because in this area, races other than Black or White are not prominent and so very little
information is lost by dichotomizing the characteristic. With a wide range of incomes, the
validity of this simpliﬁcation in %poverty does not hold well. These results are not reported.
When examining median household income, I see something similar to the Gini coeﬃ-
13One could also use a racial HerﬁndahlHirschman Index (HHI) measure of diversity. In this case, very
little is gained from such an exercise because Black and White are so prominent while other races comprise
a very small percentage of the population.
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cient. The eﬀect of increasing household income on the probability of adoption is positive.
Of course, higher incomes mean there is greater ability for the community to provide the
program (Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976; Feldstein and Taylor, 1976; Clotfelter, 1985; Auten
et al., 2002). However, all schools used in this analysis are at least potentially eligible for
a program (schools with > 50% of the student body eligible for free/reduced lunch), which
is indicative of a large number of low-income families, so as the median income rises for
this group, the income inequality also rises. This is further evidence income inequality is
associated with a greater probability of adoption and a more charitably active community.
Research Question 2 asks how community-school diversity aﬀects program adoption.
There is some evidence in prior literature that suggests donors like to give to those similar
to themselves (Luttmer et al., 2001; Okten and Osili, 2004; Hungerman, 2008). The de-
scriptive statistics in Table 3.2 show a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the ever-
and never-adopters when examining how the schools were diﬀerent than the communities
based on the percent in poverty and the percent White. Models 2 and 4 help answer this
question more completely. Community-school diversity as measured by the absolute dif-
ference in the percent White and percent in poverty (between the school and the tract)
become statistically insigniﬁcant when controlling for other factors in the decision to adopt
a BackPack program. However, the parameter estimates are relatively stable across the two
speciﬁcations and the negative sign is consistent with the descriptive statistics (a negative
sign suggests as the diﬀerence between the community and school increases the probability
of program adoption falls).
Research Question 3 asks how changing local conditions aﬀect the decision to adopt a
program. Models 3 and 4 help answer this question by including how a range of socioeco-
nomic conditions of the tracts have changed from 2000 to 2013. All changes over time are
[year 2013- year 2000] so a one unit increase is a one percentage point increase (in the
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percent unemployed, for example) from 2000 to 2013. The year 2000 represents a period
of time suﬃciently distinct from the adoption decision to serve as a reliable baseline. The
years 2009-2013 (taken from the 2013 ACS, which is an average of the preceding 5 years)
provides a picture of the tract conditions surrounding the decision to adopt a program.
The changes in the percent poverty, percent white, median income, and the income Gini
coeﬃcient have no statically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of adoption. The only
time-diﬀerence that is connected to program adoption is the change in unemployment. I
show an increase in unemployment from 2000 to 2013 is positively related to the probabil-
ity of program adoption. A priori, the eﬀect of rising unemployment is unclear. On one
hand, rising unemployment is likely associated with diminished resources with which to
support a program. On the other hand, rising unemployment is also likely associated with
a heightened need for assistance, particularly for children. The data show the latter to be
the dominant case. The percent unemployed is likely a more transitory condition than, say,
entrenched poverty, and less tied to the community's ability to initiate and sustain a pro-
gram. In a recession unemployment can ﬂuctuate dramatically. It could be that the status
quo or the expectations a community has for itself play a large role in program adoption.
If unemployment rises in a tract during a recession, a town may take action to mitigate the
eﬀects of the recession for the children.
Although not directly related to the research questions, a few other factors are signif-
icantly related to the adoption decision. First, the student/teacher ratio (often used as a
measure of the availability of school resources) does not appear signiﬁcant. However, the
percentage of the teachers who are fully is associated with aﬀect the decision to adopt. If
the student/teacher ratio proxies for the quantity of school resources, the percent who are
fully licensed may proxy for the quality of school resources. Second, the diﬀerence in the
percent of the students in a school who are White, which has appeared statistically signiﬁ-
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cantly diﬀerent between adopting and non-adopting schools in the summary statistics, does
not persist when controlling for other factors. The percent of the students in poverty does
remain as a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable. The more students in poverty, the
more likely a school is to adopt a program. Third, community percent children is nega-
tively associated with program adoption while the percent who are high school graduates is
positively correlated. The latter suggests when education is more highly valued, a program
aimed at improving student well-being is viewed more favorably. The former suggests a
suﬃcient older population may be necessary to sustain a program.
3.5.2 Factors Aﬀecting the Timing of Adoption
Research Question 4 highlights that the timing of adoption is of additional interest because
the schools that adopt early appear very diﬀerent from the schools adopting later as ev-
idenced by the stark contrast in the percent white and percent eligible for free/reduced
lunch (Table 3.2). Table 3.4 reports results from estimating Equations 1-4 replacing the
dependent variable with Ordered Adopt, which, conditional on ever adopting a BackPack,
takes a value 1 through 5 with a value of 5 denoting adoption in the earliest year (2009)
and 1 denoting adoption in the latest year (2013). A positive parameter estimate signiﬁes
that a variable is associated with earlier adoption.
Table 3.4 shows the observation that Whiter schools adopt earlier does not persist
when accounting for variation in the other school and community characteristics included
in the analysis. The school percent poverty shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
association with the timing of adoption in Models 1 and 3. Controlling for community-
school diversity (Models 2 and 4) erases this eﬀect without showing signiﬁcance themselves.
While the total number of free/reduced lunch eligible students at a school did not seem to
aﬀect the decision to adopt or not adopt a program, it is associated with later adoption.
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This ﬁnding is surprising given the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 showed early adopters
had a signiﬁcantly higher number of free/reduced lunch eligible students compared to late
adopters. The number of students eligible for free/reduced lunch is strongly negatively
correlated with the percent of the students who are White (with a correlation of -0.46,
Appendix Table 3.A1). It appears, when controlling for the percent White, the relationship
between the number of free/reduced lunch students and the timing of adoption shows an
association with later adoption.
Although the measure of community racial diversity (the tract percent white) did not
show a statistically signiﬁcant association with the decision to adopt, a higher percent white
(less racial diversity) is associated with earlier adoption. The measures of income diversity,
however, do not appear to have a signiﬁcant association with the timing of adoption. The
order adopt models show the percent of the tract who are children is associated with earlier
adoption, which was not show to aﬀect the decision to adopt or not.
When examining the community-school diversity in the descriptive statistics in Table
3.2, there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the racial community-school diversity between the
early and late adopters (suggesting late adopters exhibited more diversity of this kind).
However, when controlling for other factors that aﬀected the timing of adoption, this dif-
ference becomes insigniﬁcant (although maintains a consistent sign). This is similar to the
ﬁndings in the ever adopt analysis. It shows the community-school diversity (proxying
for donor-recipient diversity), that is prominent in the charitable giving literature may not
be as signiﬁcant in driving the adoption of charitable programs.
Lastly, an increase in the percent white in the community over time is associated with
later adoption (Model 4 in Table 3.4). Although the percent white of a community in
2000 is associated with earlier adoption, these changes over time may be associated with
less community cohesion if they mean the community is in ﬂux. These programs require
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substantial time commitment on the part of the community and it may take less cohesive
communities more time to organize.
3.5.3 Discrete Time Survival Analysis
The discrete time survival analysis (Table 3.5) jointly estimates the decision to adopt as well
as the timing of adoption. If a covariate is positively associated with the dependent variable,
it indicates a higher probability of adoption in each year and thus a higher probability of
earlier adoption as well. Also because of the panel nature of the analysis, I include year
ﬁxed eﬀects and the school characteristics are now allowed to vary over time. Covariates
that vary over time are denoted with a † in Table 3.5. I also now include the number of
schools in the county to have adopted by the previous year. To make the discrete time
survival analysis more comparable with the ever adopt and order adopt models, I also
present the results without the lagged number of adopters in Appendix Table 3.A5. This
is further discussed in the Robustness Section.
Results
The discrete time survival analysis in Table 3.5 closely mirrors the key ﬁndings from the
ever adopt analysis in Table 3.3. When considering community racial diversity, less diver-
sity (a higher tract percentage White) is associated with a higher probability of adoption
an each year and thus also associated with earlier adoption (Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.5).
This shows some support for the common ﬁnding that diversity is associated with less giv-
ing and is consistent with the ﬁnding in the order adopt models that community racial
diversity was associated with earlier adoption. I also ﬁnd continuing evidence that com-
munity income diversity (as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient) is positively associated with
program adoption (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.5). Unlike the ever adopt models, income
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does not appear statistically signiﬁcant when jointly estimating the probability and timing
of adoption, but the signs of the parameters estimates are consistent with the ever adopt
models and magnitudes are stable across speciﬁcations.
Also similar to the ever adopt and order adopt analyses, I ﬁnd community-school
diversity (the absolute diﬀerence between the school and tract based on percent white and
percent in poverty) does not play a signiﬁcant role in the decision nor timing of adoption.
However, the negative signs are suggestive of the expected relationship that less similarity
between community and school is associated with less charitable activity.
When considering how the tract has changed over time, I once again ﬁnd a close parallel
with the ever adopt analysis in that the change in the unemployment rate matters signif-
icantly and consistently across speciﬁcations. I also ﬁnd some indication that the change
in the percent white matters as well (Model 3), which is consistent with the same ﬁnding
from the order adopt analysis.
School characteristics continue to show that the student/teacher ratio does not seem
to matter, while the percentage of the teachers who are fully licensed positively aﬀects the
probability adoption as well as being associated wither earlier adoption. Lastly, and again
similar to the ever adopt analysis, the school percent in poverty is associated with greater
probability of adoption and thus earlier adoption as well.
Changes Over Time
The above discussed speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that the parameter values are time-
invariant. I explore interacting each regressor with linear time trend.14 I use this speciﬁca-
tion to show how diﬀerent factors aﬀect the likelihood of adoption in proﬁle plots of ﬁtted
14It is less restrictive to interact each regressor with year ﬁxed eﬀects. This option was explored but
produced a non-concave likelihood function and thus a maximum likelihood optimization that could not
be performed for models 2-4. Further, in Model 1, very few sets of regressor-year-ﬁxed-eﬀect parameter
estimates were shown to be statistically signiﬁcant.
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hazard functions. Figures 3.4 through 3.6 plot the ﬁtted hazard functions over time (from
models with and without time trend interactions) for communities with selected charac-
teristics based on the community racial diversity (%White), community income diversity
(Gini coeﬃcient), and the % of teachers who are fully licensed; all of which are shown to
aﬀect program adoption (full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 3.A2). To
do this, I create three artiﬁcial proﬁles of communities in the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles
for each of the above-mentioned characteristics (all other characteristics are assigned the
median value).
The hazard function indicates the probability of adoption in each year conditional on
having not yet adopted.15 Highlighting the ﬁndings shown in Table 3.5, lower racial diversity
(higher %White), higher income diversity (higher Gini coeﬃcient), and more fully licensed
teachers are all associated with a greater probability of adoption in any given year (Figures
3.4 through 3.6). Further, all three plots show a widening discrepancy over time between the
75th and the 25th percentiles. This means that the importance of these factors in program
adoption is also rising over time. Lastly, the plots show generally rising hazard rates.
This mirrors the summary statistics in Table 3.1 showing a generally rising probability of
adoption (actual adoptions are 9 [2009], 9 [2010], 21 [2011], 23 [2012] and 10 [2013]). The
exception here is in 2013 where actual additional adoptions fall. This is also observed in the
ﬁtted hazard functions that allow for more ﬂexibility through including interactions with a
linear time trend, but not in the more restrictive models that omit such interactions.
3.5.4 Robustness
There are two features of the data that one might be concerned are driving the results.
The ﬁrst is the existence of other programs similar to the BackPack program in the same
15Hazard function, h(t) = f(t)/(1−F (t)), where f(t) = the probability density function (pdf) and F (t) =
the cumulative density function (CDF ).
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counties during approximately the same time. The second is the strong eﬀect of lagged
BackPack program prevalence on current program adoption. Here, I explore alternative
speciﬁcations and show that the results are not appreciably aﬀected.
While the intent of the alternative programs is similar, the adoption criteria are not as
strict (schools are not required to have 50% of the student body participating in free/reduced
lunch, nor are they required to have 50 students interested to start a program). The
alternative programs began in 2011 but the data are rich enough only to show which school
had adopted a program by 2014. For these reasons, the schools with other programs have
been treated as having no BackPack program. I explore, ﬁrst, dropping the schools that
ever adopt an alternative program from the ever adopt analysis (Appendix Table 3.A3).
Second, I explore how the results change when treating alternative programs as equivalent
to BackPack programs (Appendix Table 3.A4).16 While some signiﬁcance is lost on key
parameters such as the Gini coeﬃcient and the change in the unemployment rate. This
loss seems to be mainly due to larger standard errors rather than substantially altered
parameter estimates. Overall, it does not appear the classiﬁcation of alternative programs
is driving the results.
The discrete time survival analysis (Table 3.5) underscored many of the main ﬁndings
from the ever adopt models (Table 3.3), but also showed a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of
lagged program prevalence. To show the results from the discrete time survival analysis are
not exclusively driven by these eﬀects, I re-estimate Table 3.5 without the lagged program
prevalence (Appendix Table 3.A5). When I do this, the signiﬁcance of the community
percent White disappears, but the parameter estimates keep the positive sign. Also, the
signiﬁcance of community income rises, and again the parameter estimates are relatively
stable across speciﬁcations. This suggests some of the results from the ever adopt analysis
16I cannot replicate the order adopt and discrete time survival analyses because I do not observe the
timing of alternative program adoption.
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are driven partially by prevalence eﬀects but not exclusively. It is encouraging that even
when allowing for the BackPack program prevalence to enter into the model, the discrete
time survival models appear very similar to the ever adopt models.
3.6 Conclusion
Many studies examining the determinants of charitable giving have found evidence that
greater diversity within the community and between community and school is associated
with diminished donations of both time and money. However, these studies have largely
focused on measures of racial and ethnic diversity. My ﬁndings support this idea. I show
modest support for the idea that donor (community) racial diversity is negatively associated
with the probability that a BackPack program adoption. However, I show the opposite is
true when considering income diversity. I ﬁnd community income diversity is associated
with a greater probability of program adoption. Given the BackPack program relies primar-
ily on donations of money but also volunteer hours, it appears community racial diversity
may be associated with lower levels of at least one of the two, and community income
diversity may be associated with higher levels.
I also show that community-school diversity does not appear to be signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with program adoption nor the timing of adoption as the prior literature has suggested.
However, I do ﬁnd evidence that spatial correlations and changing unemployment both seem
to be connected to program adoption.
The Feeding America BackPack program is a privately funded and organized program.
It relies on donations of money from the local communities surrounding the schools but there
is also a considerable time commitment donated by the community partner organizations to
sustain the programs. In further studying what drives individuals to be charitably active,
we will need to consider the eﬀects of income diversity diﬀerently than those associated
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with racial diversity.
The BackPack program is a relatively young program. With Feeding America food
banks in nearly every state, and with BackPack programs expanding, there is much to be
gained from continuing to monitor and seeking to understand what drives a community
to adopt. It will be important to examine which factors remain signiﬁcant in program
adoption as the program ages. Is there a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between early-adopting/pilot
communities and the communities that adopt later? Currently, there are not enough years
of data to test this fully. Monitoring it going forward will help not only our understanding
of the BackPack program itself, but our understanding of the emergence, adoption, and




Table 3.1: BackPack Program Schools as Percent of Eligible Schools, By County and Year*
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
NP BP % NP BP % NP BP % NP BP % NP BP %
Alamance 14 17 17 18 1 5.3 16 1 5.9
Alexander 5 1 16.7 6 1 14.3 6 1 14.3 6 1 14.3 7
Alleghany 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3 2 1 33.3
Ashe 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25 3 1 25
Caldwell 13 1 7.1 16 3 15.8 16 3 15.8 17 4 19 13 4 23.5
Davidson 10 2 16.7 17 3 15 13 8 38.1 13 9 40.9 11 9 45
Davie 3 5 6 6 6
Forsyth 35 42 36 5 12.2 29 14 32.6 17 23 57.5
Guilford 49 62 1 1.6 56 7 11.1 52 15 22.4 46 16 25.8
Iredell 12 17 1 5.6 16 2 11.1 15 3 16.7 13 3 18.8
Randolph 12 16 1 5.9 16 1 5.9 17 1 5.6 15 1 6.3
Rockingham 14 1 6.7 15 2 11.8 15 2 11.8 16 2 11.1 14 3 17.6
Stokes 2 1 33.3 8 1 11.1 8 1 11.1 9 2 18.2 8 2 20
Surry 9 1 10 12 1 7.7 13 2 13.3 13 2 13.3 13 2 13.3
Watauga 1 2 3 4 4
Wilkes 16 16 15 1 6.3 15 1 6.3 15 1 6.3
Yadkin 3 7 2 22.2 6 4 40 5 5 50 4 5 55.6
Total 203 9 4.2 263 18 6.4 247 39 13.6 240 62 20.5 207 72 25.8
*NP denotes a school with >50% free/reduced lunch eligible students without a BackPack program
*BP denotes BackPack schools; schools that have adopted a BackPack program
Note: Highlighted rows designate the main four counties by percentage and number of BackPack programs in 2013.
Note: The 2008-09 school year is referred to as 2009; similar nomenclature is followed for subsequent years.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, 2009
Never BP Early Late
Adopt Ever Adopt Adopt
All Obs (170) (66) (12) (54)
Variable Description Mean SD Mean Mean Mean Mean
All Schools in NW N.C. (N = 451)
Potentially Eligible % schools with > 50% eligible for FRL 52.3 50.0
Potentially Eligible Schools (N = 236)
School: BP Ever % schools that ever adopts a BP program 28.0 45.0
School: Early Adopt % schools that adopt in 2009 or 2010 5.1 22.0 18.2
School: % FRL % student body who are eligible for FRL 65.1 18.2 62.4 71.8 61.4 74.1
School: S/T Ratio Student/Teacher ratio of the school 12.9 3.3 13.1 12.6 13.6 12.4
School: % Full Lic % teachers who are fully licensed 94.6 6.8 93.7 96.8 98.4 96.5
School: Total FRL Elig. Number of students eligible for FRL 313.4 167.5 301.3 343.4 365.9 242.3
School: % White % student body who are White 45.2 33.0 48.8 36.0 60.4 30.6
School: % Poverty % student body who are in poverty 70.0 21.5 66.3 79.6 75.4 80.5
Census: % White % tract who are White, 2000 69.5 27.1 71.0 65.6 80.2 62.3
Census: % Poverty % tract who are in poverty, 2000 13.2 8.1 12.6 14.8 14.9 14.8
Census: % Children % tract who are children, 2000 24.1 3.8 24.1 24.1 24.3 24.1
Census: % Unemp. % tract who are unemployed, 2000 5.1 3.4 4.7 6.0 5.2 6.1
Census: % HS Grads % tract who are HS grads, 2000 31.0 6.5 30.8 31.5 33.8 31.0
Census: Med. HH Inc. Tract med. HH income, 2000 ($1000) 36.1 10.5 36.4 35.2 32.8 35.7
Census: Gini (z) Tract income gini coef., 2000 40.0 4.5 39.7 40.7 40.9 40.7
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty (abs) % poverty, abs. diﬀ., school and tract, 2000 57.5 18.4 54.7 64.8 60.5 65.7
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White (abs) % White, abs. diﬀ., school and tract, 2000 26.6 19.4 25.0 30.6 19.8 33.0
Diﬀ [a-c]: % Poverty Tract % in poverty, change 2000 to 2013 10.0 7.8 9.7 10.9 8.6 11.4
Diﬀ [a-c]: % White Tract % White, change 2000 to 2013 -4.4 9.3 -4.5 -3.9 -3.4 -4.0
Diﬀ [a-c]: Med. Inc. Tract med. HH income, change 2000 to 2013) 1.3 6.8 1.5 0.6 1.5 0.4
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini (z) Tract income gini coef., change 2000 to 2013 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Diﬀ [a-c]: % Unemp. Tract % unemployed, change 2000 to 2013 8.5 5.6 8.2 9.5 10.5 9.3
Note: Diﬀ |s-c|: denotes the diﬀerence between the school and the tract (measured by the 2000 Census).
Note: Diﬀ [a-c]: denotes the diﬀerence between the tract in 2013 measured by the ACS and 2000 measured by the Census.
Note: Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between never/ever adopt and between early/late adopt are shown in bold
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Table 3.3: Ever Adopt Probit, Potentialy Eligible Schools Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BP Ever BP Ever BP Ever BP Ever
School: Student/Teacher 0.0481 0.0352 0.0217 0.00121
(0.0502) (0.0541) (0.0527) (0.0574)
School: % Fully Licensed 6.981*** 7.318*** 7.682*** 8.083***
(2.149) (2.223) (2.278) (2.356)
School: Total FRL Eligible 0.0000744 0.000147 0.000184 0.000307
(0.000813) (0.000815) (0.000846) (0.000849)
School: % White -0.259 -1.121 -0.825 -2.422
(0.716) (1.664) (0.801) (1.853)
School: % Poverty 2.151** 5.472* 1.878* 4.592
(0.966) (3.153) (1.019) (3.354)
Census: % White -0.337 0.572 0.290 1.915
(0.860) (1.565) (0.931) (1.786)
Census: % Children -6.698* -9.268** -9.582** -11.69***
(3.533) (4.116) (3.842) (4.300)
Census: % Unemployed 4.379 2.379 7.772* 6.090
(3.945) (4.198) (4.493) (4.724)
Census: % HS Grads 6.375*** 6.695*** 7.312*** 7.569***
(2.206) (2.223) (2.495) (2.508)
Census: Income (1000) 0.0371** 0.0461** 0.0445** 0.0538***
(0.0161) (0.0184) (0.0178) (0.0199)
Census: Gini (z) 0.322** 0.252 0.305 0.264
(0.142) (0.160) (0.197) (0.216)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -1.030 -1.857
(1.671) (1.858)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -3.468 -3.032
(2.934) (3.163)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ -1.292 -0.711
(1.780) (1.890)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ 1.537 1.352
(1.368) (1.379)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ 0.00900 0.0117
(0.0208) (0.0210)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ 0.0972 0.0927
(0.192) (0.194)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ 5.473** 5.816**
(2.430) (2.503)
N 210 210 210 210
pseudo R-sq 0.149 0.156 0.179 0.187
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 3.4: Timing of Adoption, Schools to Ever Adopt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Order Adopt Order Adopt Order Adopt Order Adopt
School: Student/Teacher 0.104 0.0989 0.131 0.133
(0.111) (0.112) (0.118) (0.119)
School: % Fully Licensed -0.916 -0.0165 -0.437 0.734
(3.406) (3.522) (3.558) (3.732)
School: Total FRL Eligible -0.00299** -0.00309** -0.00295** -0.00297**
(0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00124) (0.00124)
School: % White 1.319 -2.655 1.723 -3.644
(1.223) (3.400) (1.326) (3.749)
School: % Poverty 3.376** 5.617 3.589** 4.595
(1.539) (4.877) (1.638) (5.475)
Census: % White 3.216** 7.022** 3.008** 8.253**
(1.282) (3.183) (1.473) (3.648)
Census: % Children 12.99*** 12.00** 13.98*** 13.67**
(4.690) (5.563) (5.010) (5.757)
Census: % Unemployed 1.458 -0.537 2.073 1.445
(5.154) (5.702) (5.597) (6.569)
Census: % HS Grads -4.875 -4.893 -4.925 -4.911
(3.207) (3.216) (3.569) (3.607)
Census: Income (1000) -0.0265 -0.0251 -0.0286 -0.0264
(0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0218) (0.0222)
Census: Gini (z) -0.0436 -0.0883 0.0834 0.0775
(0.195) (0.230) (0.280) (0.318)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -3.778 -5.138
(3.007) (3.324)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -2.974 -1.963
(4.653) (5.117)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ -1.825 -1.370
(2.670) (2.747)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ -4.185 -4.756*
(2.578) (2.620)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ -0.0117 -0.00943
(0.0300) (0.0301)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ -0.0905 -0.126
(0.285) (0.287)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ 0.0443 1.754
(3.636) (4.131)
N 66 66 66 66
pseudo R-sq 0.194 0.203 0.211 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Estimated using only schools to have ever adopted a BackPack program.
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Table 3.5: Discrete Time Survival Analysis, Potentially Eligible Schools Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adoptst Adoptst Adoptst Adoptst
School: Student/Teacher† 0.0300 0.0260 0.0250 0.0203
(0.0309) (0.0322) (0.0317) (0.0330)
School: % Full Licensed† 7.582*** 7.618*** 7.956*** 7.960***
(2.575) (2.591) (2.644) (2.663)
School: Total FRL Eligible† 0.000216 0.000239 0.000120 0.000150
(0.000499) (0.000498) (0.000520) (0.000519)
School: % White† -0.0812 -0.900 -0.610 -1.810
(0.504) (1.302) (0.549) (1.463)
School: % Poverty† 1.786*** 3.558* 1.460** 3.059
(0.625) (2.098) (0.645) (2.194)
Census: %White 0.524 1.373 1.273* 2.515*
(0.583) (1.262) (0.651) (1.456)
Census: % Children -0.530 -1.562 -1.234 -2.099
(2.211) (2.498) (2.275) (2.521)
Census: % Unemployed 1.373 0.505 3.716 2.997
(2.294) (2.428) (2.636) (2.804)
Census: % HS Grads 2.784** 2.932** 2.665* 2.794*
(1.390) (1.402) (1.542) (1.546)
Census: Income (1000) 0.0114 0.0169 0.0127 0.0185
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0131)
Census: Gini (z) 0.239** 0.203* 0.151 0.129
(0.0961) (0.106) (0.127) (0.136)
County: #BP Schools (t-1)† 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.121***
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0304) (0.0306)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White† -0.957 -1.347
(1.297) (1.452)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty† -1.809 -1.721
(1.918) (2.052)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ 0.103 0.388
(1.151) (1.185)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ 1.596* 1.490
(0.899) (0.909)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ -0.00695 -0.00608
(0.0141) (0.0142)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ -0.0822 -0.0824
(0.126) (0.125)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ 3.761** 3.884**
(1.650) (1.695)
N 1200 1200 1200 1200
pseudo R-sq 0.150 0.153 0.168 0.172
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Year ﬁxed eﬀects in all models. † denotes covariates that change over time
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Figure 3.1: Counties Potentially Served by the Second Harvest Food Bank of North Western North
Carolina BackPack Program
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Figure 3.2: Gini Coeﬃcient with Continuous Income
Figure 3.3: Gini Coeﬃcient with Bucketed Income
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Figure 3.4: Fitted Hazard Proﬁles: 25th 50th and 75th Percentile Proﬁles of Tract %White
(a) Without Time Interactions
(b) With Time Interactions
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Figure 3.5: Fitted Hazard Proﬁles: 25th 50th and 75th Percentile Proﬁles of Tract Gini
(a) Without Time Interactions
(b) With Time Interactions
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Figure 3.6: Fitted Hazard Proﬁles: 25th 50th and 75th Percentile Proﬁles of School % Fully Licensed
(a) Without Time Interactions





# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 School: S/T Ratio 1.00
2 School: % Full Lic 0.13 1.00
3 School: Total FRL Elig. 0.13 -0.10 1.00
4 School: % White 0.30 0.21 -0.46 1.00
5 School: % Poverty -0.43 -0.03 0.34 -0.63 1.00
6 Census: % White 0.30 0.23 -0.18 0.73 -0.42 1.00
7 Census: % Children 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.09 -0.28 1.00
8 Census: % Unemp. -0.23 -0.13 -0.03 -0.32 0.20 -0.53 -0.13 1.00
9 Census: % HS Grads 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.14 -0.02 0.40 -0.03 1.00
10 Census: Med. HH Inc. 0.24 0.15 -0.11 0.23 -0.42 0.49 0.05 -0.48 -0.38 1.00
11 Census: Gini (z) -0.20 -0.12 0.05 -0.25 0.25 -0.44 -0.15 0.42 -0.13 -0.64 1.00
12 Diﬀ |s-c|: % White (abs) -0.21 -0.07 0.43 -0.71 0.43 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.30 0.13 -0.02 1.00
13 Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty (abs) -0.43 0.00 0.32 -0.58 0.95 -0.28 0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.26 0.08 0.50 1.00
14 Diﬀ [a-c]: % Poverty -0.16 0.00 0.09 -0.24 0.32 -0.33 0.15 0.01 0.14 -0.30 0.07 0.05 0.30 1.00
15 Diﬀ [a-c]: % White 0.01 0.02 -0.19 0.25 -0.10 -0.05 0.12 0.05 0.09 -0.20 0.26 -0.42 -0.18 -0.10 1.00
16 Diﬀ [a-c]: Med. Inc. 0.18 0.05 -0.14 0.22 -0.34 0.24 0.04 -0.21 -0.16 0.32 -0.08 -0.10 -0.33 -0.51 0.26 1.00
17 Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini (z) 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.13 0.00 0.12 -0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.41 -0.08 0.07 0.41 -0.04 -0.44 1.00
18 Diﬀ [a-c]: % Unemp. -0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.19 -0.27 0.32 -0.19 0.22 -0.26 0.13 -0.09 0.13 0.45 0.11 -0.29 0.14 1.00
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Table 3.A2: Discrete Time Survival Analysis Model (4), with Time Trend Interactions
Adoptst
Baseline Interactions
Schl: Student/Teacher 0.110 Time*Schl: Student/Teacher -0.0485∗
(0.0738) (0.0284)
Schl: % Full Licensed 8.098 Time*Schl: % Full Licensed 0.784
(5.408) (2.159)
Schl: Total FRL Elig. -0.00204∗ Time*Schl: Total FRL Elig. 0.000918∗∗
(0.00122) (0.000446)
Schl: Student/Teacher -7.327 Time*Schl: Student/Teacher 1.260
(7.671) (2.177)
Schl: % Poverty 0.284 Time*Schl: % Poverty 1.227
(5.326) (2.152)
Cen: % White 9.020 Time*Cen: % White -1.863
(7.649) (2.159)
Cen: % Children 6.555 Time*Cen: % Children -3.044
(7.058) (2.496)
Cen: % Unemployed -2.183 Time*Cen: % Unemployed 2.979
(7.473) (2.751)
Cen: % HS Grads -0.498 Time*Cen: % HS Grads 1.858
(3.644) (1.366)
Cen: Income (1000) -0.0298 Time*Cen: Income (1000) 0.0268∗
(0.0358) (0.0156)
Cen: Gini (z) 0.130 Time*Cen: Gini (z) 0.0701
(0.297) (0.110)
County: #BP Schls (t-1) 0.358∗∗∗ Time*County: #BP Schls (t-1) -0.0896∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.0276)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -7.372 Time*Diﬀ |s-c|: % White 1.758
(7.814) (2.215)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty 0.656 Time*Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -1.172
(5.248) (2.056)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty 3.458 Time*Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty -1.424
(3.503) (1.325)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White 3.492 Time*Diﬀ [a-c]: White -1.399
(2.427) (0.881)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income 0.00000347 Time*Diﬀ [a-c]: Income -0.00000676
(0.0000330) (0.0000121)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini -0.00522 Time*Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini 0.0304
(0.298) (0.109)




Standard errors in parentheses Observations 1200
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 Pseudo R2 0.224
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Table 3.A3: Ever Adopt, dropping other program schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BP Ever BP Ever BP Ever BP Ever
School: Student/Teacher 0.0838 0.0526 0.0665 0.0310
(0.0553) (0.0600) (0.0572) (0.0624)
School: % Fully Licensed 7.241*** 7.864*** 7.868*** 8.398***
(2.384) (2.539) (2.499) (2.658)
School: Total FRL Eligible -0.000547 -0.000372 -0.000529 -0.000333
(0.000883) (0.000886) (0.000909) (0.000911)
School: % White -0.853 -8.977 -1.369 -12.56
(0.795) (13.97) (0.886) (17.44)
School: % Poverty 2.277** 4.695 2.227** 3.357
(1.071) (3.543) (1.114) (3.749)
Census: % White -0.372 7.517 -0.349 10.54
(1.000) (13.88) (1.099) (17.31)
Census: % Children -7.449** -9.980** -10.61** -12.04***
(3.797) (4.469) (4.169) (4.658)
Census: % Unemployed 4.492 2.088 6.676 5.098
(4.403) (4.692) (5.239) (5.465)
Census: % HS Grads 6.498*** 6.777*** 8.390*** 8.550***
(2.394) (2.463) (2.644) (2.683)
Census: Income (1000) 0.0358** 0.0451** 0.0469** 0.0549**
(0.0174) (0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0216)
Census: Gini (z) 0.205 0.169 0.295 0.311
(0.170) (0.191) (0.219) (0.245)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -8.605 -11.75
(14.11) (17.55)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -2.774 -1.559
(3.378) (3.612)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ -2.236 -1.931
(1.994) (2.163)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ 1.167 0.923
(1.485) (1.501)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ 0.0214 0.0237
(0.0230) (0.0232)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ 0.353 0.378
(0.228) (0.237)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ 2.458 2.620
(2.768) (2.856)
N 180 180 180 180
pseudo R-sq 0.171 0.191 0.196 0.214
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 3.A4: Ever Adopt, treating other program schools as having adopted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BP or Other BP or Other BP or Other BP or Other
Ever Ever Ever Ever
School: Student/Teacher 0.114** 0.0978* 0.0985** 0.0762
(0.0480) (0.0515) (0.0500) (0.0546)
School: % Fully Licensed 4.565*** 4.881*** 4.848*** 5.122***
(1.648) (1.703) (1.731) (1.792)
School: Total FRL Eligible -0.00119 -0.00109 -0.00101 -0.000854
(0.000778) (0.000780) (0.000804) (0.000808)
School: % White -0.949 -2.513 -1.158 -2.953*
(0.677) (1.629) (0.772) (1.742)
School: % Poverty 2.020** 5.258* 2.231** 5.221
(0.924) (3.082) (0.963) (3.287)
Census: % White -0.969 0.479 -1.094 0.691
(0.836) (1.506) (0.929) (1.673)
Census: % Children -6.597* -9.201** -8.477** -10.76***
(3.425) (3.971) (3.725) (4.177)
Census: % Unemployed 3.368 1.446 3.808 2.455
(4.100) (4.252) (4.714) (4.858)
Census: % HS Grads 4.138** 4.565** 7.013*** 7.346***
(2.039) (2.076) (2.334) (2.358)
Census: Income (1000) 0.0220 0.0349* 0.0401** 0.0540**
(0.0158) (0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0219)
Census: Gini (z) -0.0413 -0.104 0.245 0.199
(0.138) (0.154) (0.191) (0.206)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -1.885 -2.194
(1.677) (1.781)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -3.443 -3.281
(2.836) (3.052)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ -0.794 -0.0661
(1.726) (1.850)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ 0.0468 -0.211
(1.326) (1.342)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ 0.0313 0.0350*
(0.0206) (0.0209)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ 0.467** 0.464**
(0.186) (0.188)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ -0.320 0.125
(2.278) (2.366)
N 210 210 210 210
pseudo R-sq 0.156 0.166 0.182 0.192
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 3.A5: Discrete Time Survival Analysis, #BP schools (t-1) removed for comparison to ever
and order adopt models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adoptst Adoptst Adoptst Adoptst
School: Student/Teacher 0.0367 0.0346 0.0311 0.0283
(0.0310) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0333)
School: % Full Licensed 7.469*** 7.483*** 7.837*** 7.806***
(2.483) (2.487) (2.544) (2.555)
School: Total FRL Eligible 0.000119 0.000137 0.0000523 0.0000679
(0.000498) (0.000497) (0.000518) (0.000518)
School: % White -0.412 -0.930 -0.902* -1.843
(0.491) (1.282) (0.536) (1.464)
School: % Poverty 1.560** 3.835* 1.312** 3.261
(0.609) (2.043) (0.631) (2.129)
Census: %White 0.269 0.866 0.957 1.970
(0.560) (1.232) (0.627) (1.444)
Census: % Children -1.334 -2.697 -2.307 -3.356
(2.136) (2.423) (2.191) (2.439)
Census: % Unemployed 1.847 0.800 4.303* 3.408
(2.272) (2.394) (2.584) (2.740)
Census: % HS Grads 2.697** 2.902** 2.827* 2.953**
(1.355) (1.369) (1.496) (1.499)
Census: Income (1000) 0.0134 0.0198* 0.0165 0.0225*
(0.0105) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0126)
Census: Gini (z) 0.195** 0.145 0.136 0.0989
(0.0927) (0.103) (0.124) (0.134)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % White -0.627 -1.041
(1.273) (1.443)
Diﬀ |s-c|: % Poverty -2.269 -2.055
(1.869) (2.000)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Poverty Diﬀ -0.159 0.175
(1.137) (1.170)
Diﬀ [a-c]: White Diﬀ 1.432 1.374
(0.896) (0.905)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Income Diﬀ -0.00228 -0.00162
(0.0138) (0.0139)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Gini Diﬀ -0.0369 -0.0416
(0.121) (0.121)
Diﬀ [a-c]: Unemployment Diﬀ 3.953** 3.966**
(1.596) (1.637)
N 1200 1200 1200 1200
pseudo R-sq 0.110 0.114 0.129 0.132
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Census Tract Weighting Description
Census tracts are designed to be stable over time. However, some tracts are redrawn
from year to year. This means that variables representing a tract (e.g. median household
income) may change for two reasons. First, the characteristic may have genuinely changed.
A tract may become richer or poorer over the years due to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
industries moving in or leaving the area, or some other factor. Second, the characteristic
may change because the tract was redrawn and thus represents a diﬀerent population. The
former is the type of ﬂuctuation I hope to capture by observing the tracts in 2000 and 2010.
The latter are ﬂuctuations that are not indicative of any real change for which adjustments
should be made.
To account for this, I re-weight each tract variable to approximate a comparable pop-
ulation from year to year. To illustrate, I provide an example using the Census and ACS
variable median household income. Tracts that do not change pose no problem. Tracts
that split from 2000 to 2010 (see the top two panels of Appendix Figure 3.A1), could see
income changes from 2000 to 2010 simply due to representing a diﬀerent population in 2010
than in 2000. In this example, Tract A had a median household income of $30,000, and
was split into two diﬀerent tracts in 2010 (Tract A1 and Tract A2 with income of $40,000
and $25,000, respectively). Tract A1 represents 40% of the population from Tract A, and
Tract A2 represents 60%. To re-weight the incomes of the split tracts, I use the proportion
of the population each represents:
WeightedIncomeA1,A2 =IncomeA1 ∗ PopulationProportionA1+
IncomeA2 ∗ PopulationProportionA2
$31, 000 =$40, 000 ∗ .4 + $25, 000 ∗ .6
To re-weight the characteristics of merged tracts (see the bottom two panels of Appendix
Figure 3.A1) the same methodology is followed. In this example, Tract A and Tract B from
year 2000 are merged into a single Tract C in 2010. Once again, comparing incomes directly
across these entities will include some artiﬁcial changes, so the proportion of the Tract C
population represented by Tract A and Tract B are used to re-weight the incomes of $50,000
and $35,000 respectively to arrive at:
WeightedIncomeA,B =IncomeA ∗ PopulationProportionA+
IncomeB ∗ PopulationProportionB
$43, 250 =$50, 000 ∗ .55 + $35, 000 ∗ .45
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This methodology allows a direct comparison of tracts across years accounting for the
fact that some tracts represent diﬀerent populations than they did in previous years.
Figure 3.A1: Weighted Census and ACS Tract Variable Description
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